

NYT 12/29

ment together is the paid militias, backed by heavy weapons and air power, and the militias are just mercenaries, corrupt and degenerate. They are a real threat to the civilian population. You see them at roadblocks, reaching inside buses and grabbing money and belongings from the passengers."

Refugees from all across Afghanistan confirm Meier's description of the Government militias. Reportedly they were banished from Kabul earlier this year after committing scores of rapes, murders and robberies. They are the shock troops of the Najibullah Government, men who fight well because they believe they have nothing to lose, fearing they will be executed by the mujahedeen if they surrender. Many are Ismailis, members of a splinter sect of Islam traditionally looked down upon by mainstream Afghans; this out-group status made them natural recruits for the Russians and their allies in Kabul.

According to stories now reaching Peshawar, the militia leaders are demanding to be paid in United States dollars instead of rubles or afghanis. By many accounts, they are looking to make a run for it when Najibullah falls, but where will they go? "The militia and Khad know Najib is going down, and they are fighting for sheer survival," Meier says. "They could create a real nightmare at the end of the war."

The mujahedeen have just received from the Saudis and the Americans a shipment of captured Iraqi equipment from the Gulf War: Soviet-built tanks, heavy artillery, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns. It's odd, beat-up stuff, but most of it is serviceable. They use it to mount a new attack on Jalalabad, Afghanistan's third-largest city, between Kabul and the Khyber Pass.

This time there are no leaflets, no serious effort to spare the civilian population. The mujahedeen have little or no sympathy for civilians in Jalalabad, the families of the soldiers, militiamen and Government sympathizers. The Jalalabad area has always been a particularly bitter battlefield, even by Afghan standards.

The fighting quickly escalates into the worst of the entire war. Virtually all the

city's civilians flee the mujahedeen bombardment for either Kabul, Pakistan or nearby rural areas. The Afghan

Air Force carpet-bombs the surrounding countryside, smashing guerrilla camps, peaceful villages, civilian aid projects, everything.

Within a week, reports are reaching Peshawar that upwards of 45,000 refugees are flooding the foothills south of the city, most of them from pro-resistance villages near the front lines. They are staying with friends and relatives in villages outside the battle zone, where it is comparatively safe, but food supplies are already growing short, and winter is approaching.

Complicating matters is Washington's cutoff of non-military aid inside Afghanistan. A few months ago, two freelance American aid workers wandered into the remote central mountains of the Hazarajat, in central Afghanistan, where they were promptly taken hostage by a couple of the obscure guerrilla factions. In retaliation, the United States cut off all food, medicine and technical assistance. The weapons of war keep flowing, but the goods of mercy do not.

To help feed the refugees from the Jalalabad fighting, a nongovernmental group called the Koh-I-Noor Foundation, headed by a young Afghan named Hajji Daoud Arsala and staffed by a mix of Afghans and American volunteers, cobles together a makeshift aid program. After several days of cajoling and politicking Hajji Daoud manages to obtain 600 metric tons of wheat from United Nations stockpiles. Then he arranges for a fleet of privately owned Afghan trucks based in Peshawar to haul the stuff over the Khyber Pass and down the main Khyber-Kabul road, close by Jalalabad, where many resistance vehicles have been destroyed by enemy fire over the past few days.

The first column of trucks pulls out of Peshawar about midday on Oct. 21, heading

west across the Khyber Pass. More trucks follow in the early afternoon, and around 4, Hajji Daoud, his aide Amanullah and I, along with an armed mujahedeen escort, head out in a pickup truck, to make sure this first shipment gets through safely. After a harrowing all-night drive close by enemy lines we arrive at the village of Shpola, south of Jalalabad and just behind the mujahedeen's forward positions.

Shpola is a lovely little place, a reminder of how beautiful the country was before the war: a clear rushing river, lanes of spacious adobe compounds, shade trees, fields of wheat and corn, flower gardens. One hopeful soul has even tried to set up a motel business here — a strip of adobe rooms, with a gaudy sign depicting a chicken and a car, presumably an offer of food and lodging for the road weary. Business doesn't look very lively, and no wonder: a young doctor tells us the area around Shpola has been bombed and shelled so many times in the last few days that he has lost count.

The grain has been dropped off at the village of Agam, about 15 miles west of Shpola, where Hajji Daoud will supervise its distribution. The next few days are pure chaos, as the grain is parceled out among thousands of hungry people, virtually all of them scheming to get more than their share. Village elders show up with impossibly long lists of family heads and households, enough to make up a dozen villages, and Hajji Daoud has to argue them down to reality. There is much feigned indignation — shouting, wild gesticulating, heartfelt appeals to compassion and justice — but in every case, when Hajji Daoud has prevailed, the contentiousness dissipates instantly. The old peasants go off together, laughing about how they tried to outwit Hajji Daoud and failed. The prevailing mood is of great joy that the much-needed food has actually arrived.

Then the actual distribution begins. Hajji Daoud, his aides and a corps of armed mujahedeen guards stand on top of the mountain of 100-kilo grain sacks outside the clinic, while names of recipients are read off a list.

One by one they come forward, old white-bearded men, laughing farmers, the young sons of mujahedeen, a

war widow in black. Like all such events in Afghanistan, the grain handout is an instant festival, a celebration of simple existence. Old friends from distant villages embrace, joke, exchange gossip and news. Kids romp and play.

The mujahedeen catch one cagey customer trying to lift a grain sack on the sly from the back of the pile, and he is pummeled into retreat to cheers and laughter from the crowd; the culprit himself laughs the hardest. Another, defter character manages to shanghai a sack onto the back of a mule when no one is looking, and he races up the trail with his loot to more cheers and laughter from all. A single long-range rocket, one SU-25 or MIG with a cluster bomb, and the whole scene would be wiped out, but no one cares; in Afghanistan, you take your joy when and where you can.

THREE WEEKS AFTER I leave Afghanistan, there is good news from Moscow. A delegation of leaders of the mujahedeen parties based in Pakistan has reached an agreement with the Soviet Foreign Ministry, after a series of talks lasting from Nov. 11 to Nov. 15. "The sides confirmed the necessity of transfer of the entire state power in Afghanistan to an interim Islamic government," a statement released by the foreign ministry says. The Russians also reportedly agree to accept a mujahedeen regime in Kabul, after elections are held.

From the battlefields, from Peshawar, from the diplomatic reports, you feel instinctively that the war — narrowly construed as the overthrow of the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime — is nearing an end. But the same instincts also warn that the struggle to rebuild, physically, politically and spiritually, will be long and hard, and that a peaceful conclusion is far from guaranteed.

Not surprisingly, given the complexity of the situation, Afghan watchers are widely divided on what the future holds. Thomas Gottierre, who directs the Center of Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, is relatively optimistic. "Despite 13 years of war, the Afghans remain basically a

tolerant people," he says. "They have never had protracted civil strife in the past. They have always been able to set aside their political, ethnic, tribal and religious differences and make peace, and I think they still can."

Elie Krakowski, a professor of international relations and law at Boston University, who acted as one of the Pentagon's point men on Afghanistan during much of the war, is far gloomier. "People are saying that the Soviet empire is breaking up, and they can't send aid to Najib anymore, so everything will be hunky dory," he says. "But that's probably wishful thinking."

"The problem is, Washington has virtually abandoned Afghanistan," he continues. "Our major concern was always getting the Soviets to withdraw, not who ultimately controlled Afghanistan or the welfare of the Afghan people. That is allowing outsiders with their own agendas — the Pakistanis, the Saudis, the Iranians — to come in and divide the resistance and weaken it. Without a more direct, positive role by the United States, anything could happen. Afghanistan could fragment, or civil war could drag on forever." ■

**GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR.** Born in 1948. Under Zahir Shah was expelled from a military college for political activity. Imprisoned for 18 months when accused of killing a student Communist Party member.

Now heads the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA) numbering some 175,000 armed fighters. An expert in hand-to-hand fighting. Rumored to have coolly killed 30 members of a rival Mujahedin party.

**PIR SAYYID AHMAD GAILANI.** 58. Twice Afghan MP. In 1963-64 involved in drafting constitution for royalist Afghanistan. Was adviser on Islam to Zahir Shah and Premier Daoud. Believed to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. Head of the National Islamic Liberation Front, whose armed units number 18,000. Likewise not allowed to go to Moscow, where sent son.

Rob Schultheis is the author of the forthcoming "Night Letters," a book on the war in Afghanistan.

New Times  
#47, 91

# At the Center of the World

By M. J. Akbar

## Iran's official newspaper demands death for radical resistance leader

The official daily newspaper of the Iranian government, Kayhan International, has demanded death for the leader of the Afghan Hezb-i-Islami party leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Sharply criticizing the role of Hekmatyar during the 12-year-old Afghan war, the paper said that neither the Soviet Union nor Afghan President Najibullah had as badly harmed Afghans as Hekmatyar did. The paper said: "...there should be some daring Afghans to end this man." Hekmatyar, considered a fundamentalist, has often been accused of collaborating with both the Soviets and Kabul forces when it suited his personal objectives.

An American specialist on Afghanistan, Dr. Frederick Smith, says that Afghans have never been fundamentalists, and, therefore, Hekmatyar does not have a large following. But for a long time his very disciplined and fanatical forces were a favorite of the Pakistani authorities who saw to it that he got the greatest share of any assistance that transited Pakistan.

In his zeal to impose his will, Hekmatyar has attacked or blocked the activities of adjacent Mujahideen groups, which only benefits Najibullah. However, Hekmatyar's star now seems to be on the wane and the Commander's Shura works around him or without him.

## Kabul forces undergoing hardships

According to a senior communist militia official, Kabul's armed forces face severe difficulties in northern Afghanistan and are short of weapons and soldiers in their fight against the Afghan resistance.

"The government simply doesn't have enough troops in the north and soon this problem is going to become critical," Abdul Qudoos Pianshi, deputy chairman of the Sazir militia, told Reuters.

The Afghan resistance have stepped up attacks against government forces while the Soviet-installed Kabul regime is failing to supply some units with arms. The Soviet hard-liners who were the biggest supporters of Kabul's president, Gen. Najibullah, were swept from power following the failed putsch in Moscow, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is a strong opponent of Soviet aid to Kabul.

December - February 1991-1992

NEW DELHI

**T**oday, with Achilles dead, is there much point in continuing to gnaw away at his heel? There cannot be an outpost of the Soviet empire any longer if the empire is dead.

It is common knowledge that the empire finally bled to death through Afghanistan. But while Washington has adjusted its policies toward Moscow to take new realities into account, its policy toward Afghanistan still seems to suffer from a mental block. This remains true despite the agreement with the former Soviet Union to end military assistance to Afghanistan's warring factions.

Replacing the Government of Najibullah, the ex-Soviet Union's puppet, is no longer the real issue; the issue is what forces will get in instead. And in the radically altered geopolitics of the region, Afghanistan could play a key role.

Boris Yeltsin's commonwealth is at best a temporary mechanism, to take care of anomalies as dangerous as 27,000 nuclear weapons spread across four Slavic and Muslim republics, or as curious as a national army without a nation. Russia's dispute with Ukraine over the Black Sea fleet suggests that resolutions will not come easily. But once this vast political seismic disturbance finally settles, the old Soviet Union is likely to reform into two blocs: a Christian and an Islamic commonwealth.

The tension between the two cultures is a fact of history, and the moment has come for the two to go their separate ways. They will move at a glacial pace, but one will travel toward Europe and the other toward Iran or Turkey. And it is in the sweep of Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan, across the belly of the world, that the struggle for a new order will begin.

One of the few nations that can claim to have emerged stronger in 1991, the most turbulent year since World War II, is Iran. Two of its needs were fulfilled, courtesy of the two superpowers. Iran watched with quiet satisfaction as the U.S. flattened Iraq, its only serious rival in the region. And it watched with even greater satisfaction the realization of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's prophecy about the end of Communism (which

formed the theme of the imam's famous letter inviting Mikhail Gorbachev to become a Muslim and join the common cause against America).

Iran also brilliantly used 1991 to calm Western minds about it, rediscovering what a country as old as Persia should never have lost: the art of diplomacy. After the trauma of revolution and war, Iran bought time to replenish its energies. The collapse of the Soviet Union also provides Iran with a hinterland, long sealed off.

Iran needs all the strength it can build, for it has not lost sight of its primary cause: the leadership of the Islamic world, the true victory of its Islamic revolution and then the epochal confrontation with the Great Satan. But this pre-eminence among Muslim nations will not come easily. There is a battle that will be fought between fundamentalist and secular Islamic forces.

Afghanistan is strategically located to play a vital role in that struggle, and a great deal will depend on which political conviction is in power in Kabul. For more than a decade, the West lavishly and unquestioningly financed and armed fundamentalist, reactionary armed bands in order to make the Soviet Union pay a heavy price for its intervention.

That was understandable. But why does the support continue, directly or through Pakistan, after the fundamentalist faction that benefited most from U.S. money supported Saddam Hussein? Would an Afghanistan controlled by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the militant fundamentalist, make more sense than one under Najibullah?

The Lesser (Soviet) Satan died of natural causes. And the Great (American) Satan is trying to build a new world order in conformity with its interests. The next war will be between Christianity and Islam, the Ayatollah Khomeini predicted.

The West will have the guns, but the Ayatollah's children, who extend far beyond Iran, will have inspiration. They will hear the call for martyrdom and respond. Armies can be defeated. Martyrs are another matter. □

M. J. Akbar, the founding editor of *The Telegraph*, an Indian newspaper, is author, most recently, of "Kashmir: Behind the Veil."

NYT 1/10/92

# Mujahedin in Moscow, Najibullah thus far in Kabul

An afterword to the odd talks,  
at which neither party was sure where it stood

**T**he only news conference that the Mujahedin held while in Moscow wound up a little after 8 p.m. on November 15. Read out there was the document agreed after a week of talks, the joint statement of the Soviet and Russian sides and the Mujahedin delegation. From the Russian Federation White House the Afghans set out for the airport, and there something totally unforeseen occurred.

The delegation of Afghan Mujahedin was composed of two groups, one from Pakistan, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan and Foreign Minister in the Peshawar-based provisional Mujahedin government, the other from Iran led by Mortazawi, the Chairman-Speaker of the Party of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan. What happened at the airport was that Mortazawi unexpectedly objected to the text of the joint statement that he had himself signed only four hours earlier. The initial panic gave way to a sigh of relief when he explained what he actually sought to change. It appeared that the Iranian Mujahedin were against having only Prof. Rabbani named in the statement as head of the joint Mujahedin delegation and wanted the two, Iranian and Pakistani delegations to be indicated as equals but united in one delegation headed by two leaders, but under Rabbani's joint leadership.

Such was the odd and somewhat unexpected manner in which the two groups of Mujahedin manifested for the first and last time their differences at the talks. However, a political show, as the upshot of different views, which reporters had anticipated did not come off. The Mujahedin came out jointly, shelving personal ambitions and holding back personal pride, in order to secure a common goal. One may only guess what made Mortazawi act so strangely at the very last moment. Either nerves failed him, or he had quarrelled with the "Pakistanis" on the way to the airport, or else the Iranians were against as despite their wish to influence Afghanistan's policy, they had been given the text of the agreement at the last moment.

On the other hand, the other side, or rather sides, had furnished more than enough food for diverse interpretation.


## Face-saving

The Mujahedin came to Moscow at the invitation of two offices. The first was from the Soviet MFA. Later Iona Andronov, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and External Economic Ties, presented an invitation on President Yeltsin's behalf, when in Pakistan. It was only, therefore, that on the very morning of their arrival Russian Federation Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi received, in camera, the Mujahedin delegation.

Mohammad Amin Mousif of the Pakistani group understood Alexander Rutskoi as having said that "the current Russian leadership is not

responsible for the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan and promises to bring pressure to bear on the USSR government to have all interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and backing for the Najib puppet regime end."

According to other members of the delegation, Alexander Rutskoi told the Mujahedin that for Russia the POW problem was the priority and that the Yeltsin administration was prepared to do anything to set them free. What does that "anything" actually imply?



Alexander V. Rutskoi

At a meeting with the POW mothers Prof. Rabbani listed demands first made yet five years ago. These were to end all aid to Kabul, remove President Najibullah, release all imprisoned oppositionists, and extend official recognition to the Mujahedin. However, the issue of arms deliveries was raised in a somewhat different light. We, Prof. Rabbani said, want this very night to hear the Soviet leadership declare that it forbids the Najibullah regime to employ Soviet-delivered weaponry. "I," Prof. Rabbani admitted, "would like to spend my time in Moscow to resolve political issues so that the field commanders holding your POWs realize that you have really changed your policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan." Mortazawi, meanwhile, clinched the matter by declaring that it would be very difficult to settle the POW issue unless the Afghan problem was radically resolved and Soviet policy vis-à-vis Kabul modified.

Just lately, the Soviets are prepared to enter into a dialogue while only recently Moscow and Washington announced the termination of arms deliveries to Afghanistan as of next January 1, yet now we hear one ultimatum after another.

Incidentally, this was only to be expected from the Mujahedin. Whereas the Russian Federation thought negotiations would reduce exclusively to a discussion of the POW issue, the Mujahedin on the other hand made no bones about their desire to discuss political issues in Moscow first of all. If Russia was not inclined to discuss politics, then she had to be compelled to do so. Furthermore, according to what I have heard, when "luring" the Mujahedin to Moscow it had been broadly hinted

that they put forward their own terms, as we were amenable to everything. In the upshot Russian Federation MFA officials found themselves in a bit of a quandary, as they could not meet the terms the Mujahedin put; yet at the same time they were obliged to engage in a face-saving exercise for Vice-President Rutskoi. From what was said in the foyer I understood that the situation had been saved by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Belonogov, who led the Soviet side and who is familiar with the Afghanistan problem as the result of his UN activity. The stance taken by the USSR MFA, which the Russian Federation MFA echoed was tough: It was that though the USSR would no longer supply Afghanistan with arms and would no longer interfere in the internal affairs of its sovereign neighbour, the squabble between Peshawar and Kabul was the internal affair of the Afghan people. In the roundabout way that Prof. Rabbani put it, at that final news conference he implied that the Russian Federation had taken a determined stance, that the USSR had been vacillating but that in the long run agreement had been reached.

In all probability there would have been no agreement and the talks would have deadlocked; however, the Mujahedin had to leave and didn't want to go away with empty hands, as too great an effort had been expended to coax most of the groupings into consenting to a dialogue with Moscow. However, disagreement still exists. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan has already announced in Peshawar that he will not accept the Moscow agreements and documents.

## Always against

Hekmatyar has demonstrated once again that despite all the recent get-togethers, whether in Islamabad, Teheran or in the UN in New York, the Mujahedin still have differences and that represented in Moscow was far from the full range of views in the Afghan resistance movement.

There is firstly a difference between the Pakistani Sunni Mujahedin, who are mostly Pushtuns, and the Iranian Shiite opposition who reflect the opinions of the Afghan national minorities, more specifically the Hazaras. True, the differences are rather of a national than religious character. Thus, the Iranian Mujahedin did not recognize the provisional Afghan Mujahedin government set up in Pakistan in 1989 as the quota allotted to the Hazaras was too small. Incidentally, they have never been represented in the country's political or military elite except when Afghanistan's Prime Minister in the early 1980s was the Hazara Keshmdad. Hence the rather loyal attitude of the Iranian Mujahedin to the current Kabul administration. The Hazaras are willing to have a political settlement and have agreed to the UN-proposed programme for resolving the Afghan crisis.

The militarily weakish Iranian Mujahedin want elections held. However, they disagree with those Pakistan Mujahedin who have already agreed to such elections. The moderate Peshawar-based opposition wants these elections to follow the old traditional Loya Jirga model, which specified a system of quotas and is of a multistage order. The

Iranian Mujahedin want the "one man - one vote" principle, with female suffrage as this would provide them with some leverage in a future Islamic government.

Last June Teheran, which fears that disunity in the weakish Iranian Mujahedin will leave them out in the cold on Afghanistan's future political scene, managed to found the party of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan with Mortazawi at its head. However, the unity was short-lived. Only two months later, four groupings proclaimed an independent Coalition Council for an Islamic Revolution and an Afghan Jihad headquartered in Peshawar. Heading this council is Ayatollah Mohseni, a Shiite and Pushtun. Evidently the national factor may even come to outweigh the religious aspect in the Mujahedin movement.

However, even in Peshawar not all Mujahedin are of one mind. Anything such moderate leaders as Mojaddedi, Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi and Gailani may do, fundamentalists Hekmatyar, Junos Khalis, Abdul Rasul Sayaf reject it out of hand. Thus on the eve of the Moscow talks, Khalis declared he would not support these talks as all discussion with the enemy on his territory conflicted with Islam.

Answering the UN proposal for a peace conference on Afghanistan Hekmatyar said: "This is a US proposal that seeks to pave the way for a coalition of royalist semi-Mujahedin." He also thinks the termination of Soviet and US arms deliveries to Afghanistan will be of little use as in the three months between the signing of the relevant agreement and next January 1, the Soviets may reinforce Kabul's armed might.

Hekmatyar's "neither West nor East" tactics greatly suit Pakistan as it hopes to control a future Islamic Afghanistan.

On the eve of the Mujahedin delegation's arrival in Moscow all these differences erupted into an open squabble. As a result, instead of heading the delegation Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, the President of the provisional government, dispatched his brother Hashmatullah Mojaddedi. Meanwhile Sayyid Gailani sent his son Hamid to Moscow. Thus the delegation was led by Prof. Rabbani. At the same time the moderate Mujahedin quarreled with Pakistan, or rather with its ISI military intelligence, accusing it of plotting to wreck Afghanistan's power grid and dynamite three major dams. Mojaddedi even threatened that were Islamabad to continue to interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs and exert pressure on the President of the provisional government, he would leave Peshawar for Afghanistan or some other country.

However, in Moscow the Mujahedin were united on the central issue which is that for peace to come to Afghanistan they must get the USSR to remove Najibullah and must wage their jihad until victory is won.

## Najibullah?

President Najibullah gave a rather restrained reception to the Soviet-American decision to terminate arms deliveries, hinting that it would be a good thing were Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia to likewise stop giving military aid to the Mujahedin. Of course he could not react otherwise. He accepted with dignity the UN proposal for a transitional government in Kabul. Peres de Cuel-

lar says that according to the data he has "some current Kabul leaders" will not press for personal involvement either in an intra-Afghan dialogue or in a transitional government realizing that they are too repulsive for the other side. Apparently Najibullah is one such leader.

But where will Najibullah go after the newly created Islamic government in Kabul definitely tries to kick him out?

When Soviet troops quit Afghanistan, Western newsmen paid as much as thousand dollars in backsheesh to rent rooms in Peshawar's one and only decent hotel. The influx was so great, as the West was sure Kabul would soon cave in. Indeed, at the time Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladimir Kryuchkov invited Najibullah to temporarily send his family to USSR. However, Najibullah refused, saying that his family had already chosen to stay on with him in Kabul.

When in 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev, then CPSU General Secretary, pressed for a Soviet pull-out from Afghanistan, the Karmal administration balked, but Najibullah, whom Moscow chose to head the Kabul government, promised to let Soviet troops go.

He is a strong-willed man and it is quite possible that he will stay on in

Kabul even after an Islamic government is elected. On the other hand, it may well be that he is sure of his own cabinet's future. After all, we still do not know how field commanders will react to the Moscow agreement, especially their Number One man Ahmad Shah Masud, recently Panjeri's sole ruler, who will most likely be displeased with the Moscow meeting to which he was not invited. Which way will he turn? All this gives Najibullah something of a chance.

## Whom did we fight? Who are we talking with?

What irked the Mujahedin delegation most was the question that reporters asked as to inner conflicts. Prof. Rabbani told me:

"We were united in the war against the Soviet invading army. Now we are united in establishing an Islamic government in Kabul. But each party naturally wants to win. What we have now are natural political problems and differences.

"Most of us have come here jointly for establishing peace. Those who did not

come thought that the Soviets would not change their policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan, that the Soviets would not be willing to go for a political settlement. However, our differences are not so deep as is said."

If the Peshawar government takes over in Kabul, what problem will assume priority?

"The repatriation of refugees, reconstruction of housing, of which 80 percent has been destroyed in the war. For 13 years education was forgotten and we will have to work on an educational programme. Though we built schools in our refugee camps we could not tackle the problem in all its complexity in wartime. A huge job is to defuse the some 50 million mines. Economically, the country is bankrupt. In short, whatever we undertake in Afghanistan we shall have to start from zero."

When I asked at the final news conference whether the Majahedin would now establish relations separately with each of the states of former Soviet Central Asia, Prof. Rabbani said:

"We naturally have a stake in promoting relations with our neighbours, the USSR and Russia. However, considering the historical and cultural links and the common language and religion, our relations with those republics will be of a specific order."

What, I wonder? For Moscow is far away, while Kabul is near at hand.

*Irina Lagunina*

NEW TIMES 47.91

## common ground

After days of talks, the two sides agreed on the following points:

• The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was condemned.

• All the state power should be transferred to an Islamic interim government.

• The Mujahedin will hold general elections in Afghanistan within two years after the formation of the interim government. The elections will be supervised by the UN and OIC.

• All agreements signed between Kabul and Moscow since the April Coup of 1978 will be reviewed by the interim Islamic government. It will have the power to endorse or reject them.

• Both sides will cooperate on the release of POWs. The Mujahedin will release the first group of Soviet POWs before the end of the year.

• The Soviet Union agreed to cut arms supplies (including fuel for military use) before the start of next year. They also agreed to withdraw their military advisers from Afghanistan before January 1992.

• The Soviets agreed to take part in reconstruction of Afghanistan.

• A joint commission will be formed, within a month, to supervise the implementation of the agreement between the two sides.

December 1, 1991

AFGHANews

*Islamabad was conduit for Israeli arms to Iran*

# The Contra sideshow

By Lawrence Lifschultz in Islamabad

**D**uring the 1980s Pakistan became a conduit for the sale of hundreds of millions of dollars of American-made weapons to Iran. Former and serving government officials from Pakistan and Israel have described how the US\$2 billion supply network established to provision the Afghan resistance was exploited as a source of weapons and funds. According to their accounts, Pakistan functioned as a secret back door for a supply operation into Iran which vastly exceeded in scope and scale the known dimensions of the so-called Iran-Contra operation which came to light in 1986.

A former officer in a special intelligence unit of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) claims that for three years an Israeli military logistics and advisory team was stationed secretly in Pakistan with the cooperation of the government in order to oversee and manage the shipment of arms into neighbouring Iran.

At the same time the Israelis were also reportedly working as trainers and advisers to mujahideen groups, in particular the fundamentalist Hizbe-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. According to one Pakistani source, several IDF members died in Afghanistan during operations with mujahideen units.

Two Pakistani intelligence sources with direct knowledge of particular phases of the operation have described how vast amounts of arms were sent to Iran from special depots in Pakistan during the 1984-86 period. Neither official could put an exact value on the shipments, but one asserted that "crores [tens of millions] of dollars worth of weapons were shipped to Iran from army depots in this country."

He said that he had personally observed the loading and shipping of weapons to Iran but claimed this was part of a larger operation taking place at different locations in Pakistan. He claimed to have seen "truckload after truckload going into Iran with arms." The National Logistics Cell, a special agency under the command of the Pakistani army, was the main carrier.

Neither Pakistani official was willing to be identified. One of them still occupies a senior position. A third Pakistani source, a prominent figure in Pakistan's Shia community with close associations with both the Iranian Government and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), confirmed that a group of Israeli military officers were

in Pakistan at least during 1985.

Although Pakistani sources are reluctant, for reasons of personal security, to be publicly identified, their accounts match the testimony of Ari Ben-Menasse, a former Israeli intelligence official who says he travelled to Pakistan in 1985 to supervise the transshipment of a substantial consignment of weapons to Iran.

Ben-Menasse has provided the most detailed account of Pakistan's substantive but back-door role. He served for over a decade in the IDF's External Relations Department and says he participated in one of Israel's most sensitive inter-agency intelligence committees during the 1980s.

Ben-Menasse grew up in Iran and is fluent in Farsi, Arabic, English and Hebrew. In 1977 he joined Israeli military intelligence as an Iran specialist. He served in the IDF until 1987 before becoming an adviser to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

Ben-Menasse claims that from the early 1980s he was one of a six-member Joint Committee — comprising representatives from every major organisation in the Israeli intelligence community — set up to organise the systematic but clandestine provisioning of Iran in its war with Iraq. The Israeli assessment was that Iraq represented a serious military threat to Israel, and therefore Iran, whether Islamist or royalist, was Tel Aviv's strategic ally against Iraqi regional ambitions.

In the context of the Iran-Iraq War, it became the Joint Committee's responsibility to secure whatever military equipment was deemed necessary to support Iran's military effort. Ben-Menasse says hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons were supplied to Iran from a network of Israeli-controlled corporations which operated under the authority and direction of the committee in every corner of the globe.

In 1984, Ben-Menasse met Gen. Fazle Huq, a leading figure in the late Gen. Zia-

ul Haq's military regime, for the first time in London. By then Huq had become the dominant military figure in Pakistan in charge of operations linked to Pakistani support for the Afghan resistance. Ben-Menasse says he met Huq a number of times in London and later in Peshawar to work out the logistics for a huge shipment of weapons to Iran using the Pakistani route. (Huq was assassinated in the autumn of 1991 outside his home in Peshawar.)


In the autumn of 1985, Ben-Menasse arrived in Peshawar on behalf of the Joint Committee to coordinate an arms shipment to Iran which had special requirements. He claims that along with other members of an IDF logistics team he stayed at the Park Hotel in Peshawar using false passports. He insists that the visit was fully coordinated with the Pakistan and Iranian governments.

In Pakistan, Ben-Menasse linked up with an Israeli military mission which was already in place. He asserts that between 1983 and 1986 an IDF logistics team and military advisory group charged with two principal tasks functioned on a full-time

basis in Pakistan. First, Israeli advisers trained mujahideen in military tactics and the use of sophisticated weapons. At the request of Islamabad, the Afghan group the Israelis worked most closely with was the Hizbe-Islami. "Hekmatyar knew exactly who he was working with," says Ben-Menasse. In 1985, Ben-Menasse says, Israeli and Pakistani intelligence agencies jointly arranged a US\$300 million diversion of weapons to Iran. The source for the diversion was the covert arms pipeline already in operation for the mujahideen under the supervision of the ISI and the CIA.

The 1985 shipment had to go through Peshawar because it was necessary that all documentation show that arms intended for the rebels had in fact arrived at their official destination in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. "The Americans wanted it that way. The paperwork had to show that the weapons arrived in Peshawar. Delivery had to be taken in Peshawar," Ben-Menasse said.

Several million dollars worth of weapons from the 1985 shipment were handed over to mujahideen groups, according to Ben-Menasse, but the balance, making up



most of the US\$300 million worth of equipment, was shipped to Iran from Pakistan. An eager Iranian Government agreed to the arrangement and paid the full bill.

The most intriguing yet intricate aspect of the 1985 operation is Ben-Menashe's claim that the arms were paid for twice, generating an "off-the-books" surplus of US\$300 million.

In the first round, the arms were paid out of appropriations authorised by the US Congress for military aid to the mujahideen. On this basis weapons were shipped to Pakistan for delivery to the rebels. Yet, according to Ben-Menashe, in August 1985 Teheran deposited US\$300 million into Israeli-controlled accounts in Luxembourg. Within two months the shipment for the rebels had been diverted via Peshawar and by October 1985 the entire consignment had crossed Pakistan's border into Iran under the eyes of an Israeli logistics team.

Ben-Menashe asserts that the 1985 operation was not a rogue covert operation thought up by three of the oddest bedfellows of West Asia — Israel, Pakistan and Iran. "The issue was that our American friends needed this money. This was planned with the Americans. This whole thing started in 1984, but it came to fruition in the second half of 1985. This was the first major attempt to create funding for those people in the American intelligence community linked to the Contras. It was done for these guys only for this purpose.

"We do not know exactly what the Americans did with the money. But, the money was paid back to them later through accounts in Europe. First, an amount of money is allocated to [the CIA] by Congress for the Afghan operation. Then the Iranians paid US\$300 million. The money that came from the Iranians went to these [CIA] guys, and the money allocated by Congress went to pay for the arms."

Ben-Menashe claims he met with CIA officials in Pakistan and in the US to fine-tune the diversion. In Pakistan, he met with George Cave, an Iran specialist for the CIA. On a 1985 trip to the US, he also discussed the operation with Clair George, deputy director for operations at the CIA.

In a written reply to questions Cave has stated, "I have never met Mr Ben-Menashe, so could never have discussed with him the supplying of arms to the Afghan resistance." Attempts to reach George through his Washington lawyer, Richard Hibe, have not been successful. George is currently facing charges from the

Iran-Contra Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh for having deliberately misled the US Congress during hearings on the Iran-Contra affair.

If Ben-Menashe's claim is indeed true it would represent an illegal diversion of US Government funds on a scale significantly greater than the amount publicly acknowledged by the Reagan administration when the Iran-Contra scandal came to light. Ben-Menashe also maintains that while US\$300 million was diverted from the Afghan arms pipeline, Israel separately shipped to Iran through Pakistan "substantially more" than the value of the Afghan diversion over a three-year period. This would place total transfers above US\$600 million. The weapons allegedly shipped included artillery, TOW anti-tank missiles, ammunition and a wide range of spare parts.

Ben-Menashe is a controversial figure. He is a primary source for two books recently published by Random House in the US — *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* by journalist Seymour Hersh and *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan* by Gary Sick, a former US National Security Council official and point man on Iran for the Carter administration.

Hersh and Sick regard Ben-Menashe as a credible source. His revelations, however, touching as they do on some of the most sensitive domestic and foreign policy issues in the US, have made him the object of strong criticism in certain sections of the American press.

Davies denied the charge, but was dismissed by the Mirror Group just days before British tycoon Robert Maxwell's mysterious death off the coast of Spain. The denouement occurred when an American arms merchant from Ohio told the *Daily Mail* and *The Guardian* that Davies had in fact met him to arrange an arms deal. The original source for Hersh's account was Ben-Menashe.

Ben-Menashe's reasons for breaking the code of silence of the Israeli intelligence community appear to date back to 1989 when he was arrested in the US for conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act by trying to sell C130 military aircraft to Iran. He was tried and acquitted of all charges in November 1990, but not before he had spent a full year in jail.

In his defence, Ben-Menashe claimed his actions had the approval of the US and Israeli governments. When the Israelis and American intelligence refused to bail him

out, Ben-Menashe — angered by what he regarded as betrayal and also fearing for his life — decided to speak out.

Another view holds that Ben-Menashe still has links with Israeli intelligence and that his revelations, selective in nature, are perhaps calculated to pressure the US at a time when relations are at a low ebb over renewed efforts to secure a Middle East settlement. However, it should be added that the Washington journal, *New Republic*, which is closely identified with Israel, has been the most vociferous in its criticism of Ben-Menashe.

With respect to the Pakistan connection in the Iran-Contra affair, it has been possible to corroborate some of Ben-Menashe's claims. Pakistani intelligence sources confirm that significant quantities of weapons meant for the mujahideen were diverted to Iran. Other sources in Pakistan close to the Iranian Government and Pakistani intelligence confirm the presence of a secret Israeli military team in Islamabad during at least 1985. The more difficult question concerns the issue of whether funds appropriated by the US Congress were illegally diverted from the Afghan aid programme and whether it is possible to independently verify such claims.

On 5 March 1987 the REVIEW reported allegations in Washington that only US\$390 million of US\$1.09 billion appropriated by Congress for the CIA in 1980-86 to support the mujahideen had actually reached them. The REVIEW reported allegations that US\$700 million in aid earmarked by Congress for Afghan rebels had disappeared — and that there may have been attempts to divert some of the money to the Nicaraguan Contras — were to be investigated by both Congress and the US Government.

The allegations regarding the "missing millions" were made in February 1987 by a Washington-based conservative political organisation, the Federation for American Afghan Action (FAAA), which had been working closely with mujahideen groups. Andrew Eiva, chairman of FAAA, in consultation with rebel organisations, drew up statistical estimates of actual arms deliveries received by the seven rebel factions based in Peshawar and matched these against appropriations. The disparities were significant.

Eiva said FAAA research showed that of US\$342 million appropriated by Congress for the mujahideen in 1980-84, the value of aid, including arms, actually reaching rebels in Afghanistan was only US\$36 million. When the narrower statistic regarding the actual delivery of arms was calculated, Eiva told the *Washington Post* that he estimated 70% of the military assistance never reached the rebels. Eiva said similar proportions were diverted from the 1985 and 1986 appropriations of US\$280 million and US\$470 million respectively.



Reagan: new questions.



# Afghan Rebels Aim for Concessions in Moscow

*Despite cool tone to talks, Soviets offer apology for role in conflict*

**By Justin Burke**

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

MOSCOW

**E**YES filled with tears and voices choked up with emotion as a group of Soviet parents met early this week with leaders of the Afghan mujahideen resistance, seeking information on the whereabouts of their sons.

Several dozen Soviet soldiers who served in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989 are still being held prisoner by rebel groups more than two years after the Soviet military withdrawal. Many of the anguished parents have had no contact with their sons since their capture.

"We ask that you return our children," said one woman before breaking down in sobs during the meeting Monday.

Despite the impassioned pleas, Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of a mujahideen rebel delegation in Moscow for peace talks, offered precious little information, other than to say all prisoners are being treated "humanely."

Such is the nature of the first-ever visit of the Afghan mujahideen to Moscow. Though Soviet and rebel leaders have opened a face-to-face dialogue, they have made little progress toward ending the 13-year-old civil war in Afghanistan. The return of the POWs is just one issue over which the Soviets and mujahideen leaders remain deadlocked.

By far the biggest barrier to a peace settlement is the future status of Afghan President Najibullah, the former secret police chief. The rebels refuse to have any dealings with Najib, who served as Moscow's point man for much of the civil war, and insist he not be part of any future political arrangement.

Having defied many predictions by remaining in power after the departure of his Soviet sponsors, Najib has said in the past he is willing to step down if it would bring peace to his country. But he has yet to fulfill this pledge.

Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin has indicated Moscow is flexible about Najib's participation in post-civil war Afghan politics.

But as a Tass news agency commentary said, it is unrealistic of the mujahideen to expect the Soviet Union, beset by domestic

political and economic turmoil, to have the ability to oust the Afghan leader. Tass also dismissed other rebel demands in similar fashion,

including \$100 billion in war reparations and the abrogation of all Soviet treaties made with the Kabul government over the last 13 years.

"The Soviet Union is not empowered to solve issues of the internal setup in another country," Tass said. "One ought to take into account that Najib and the forces that stand behind him represent a weighty political reality that can't be ignored," the commentary continued.

Though the rebels' demands have been received coolly, the Soviets do not lack any desire to end completely their involvement in the Afghan civil war, says Andrei Shumikhin, an expert on conflict resolution at the USA-Canada Institute in Moscow.

Toward that end both the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to stop shipping arms to the combatants in Afghanistan by Jan. 1.

"I'm sure the people involved in the conflict are sick and tired of it," Mr. Shumikhin says.

A joint statement issued in late September by Mr. Pankin and US Secretary of State James Baker III renewed calls for the formation of a caretaker coalition government to carry out free elections. A cease-fire must be in place before a settlement can be reached, Pankin told the Afghan rebel delegation, according to the Interfax news agency.

Even if the Soviets reached agreement with the resistance leaders in Moscow, it is unclear how effective such a peace settlement would be. The Afghan resistance alliance is sharply divided and infighting has intensified in recent weeks. Three of the seven rebel groups based in Peshawar, Pakistan, including the powerful Hezb-i-Islam Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, refused to send representatives to Moscow.

In an interview with the daily Komsomolskaya Pravda, Mr. Hekmatyar said he was not against holding talks with the Soviets, but added his representatives weren't dispatched to Moscow because he didn't expect "concrete results." He also accused the Soviet Union and the US of trying to force a coalition government on Afghanistan.

"In our country a coalition government is impossible because sooner or later it will show its ineffectiveness and inability to stabilize the situation," Hekmatyar said, vowing to continue fighting until the rebels achieved an outright military victory. "I'll never accept one government imposed on us by foreigners."

But whether the rebels like it or not, the Soviet Union and the US will be needed to bring peace to Afghanistan even if only temporarily, said Shumikhin.

"Even without direct Soviet and American involvement [in arms shipments], the two sides are capable of fighting forever," Shumikhin said. "They need an intermission, but they don't know how to do it themselves."

Despite the difficulties surrounding a peace settlement, some positive developments have come out of the Moscow visit, some rebel leaders said.

During a meeting with the Afghan delegation Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi apologized for the Soviet invasion in 1979. An official apology for the war is another rebel condition for a settlement.

"He admitted that it was a big mistake and repeatedly said we [the Soviet Union] should not be held responsible for past mistakes," rebel spokesman Massoud Khalili said of Mr. Rutskoi, himself an Afghan war hero and former POW in Afghanistan.

"It was constructive. It was effective, and it impressed Rabbani a lot," Mr. Khalili added.

November 15, 1991

**BURHANUDDIN RABBANI**, 50, leader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (ISA). Taught theology at Kabul University. In 1976 emigrated to Pakistan, where founded ISA, which after the IPA has the second largest armed force. Led opposition delegation to talks with Soviet representatives in Al-Taif, Saudi Arabia, in December 1988 where Yuli Vorontsov demonstrated tougher stance than Russian Federation's present leaders. Since February 1989 a member of the "provisional government of Afghan Mujahedin," in which held office first as Minister of Reconstruction, and subsequently, as Foreign Minister. Is pragmatic as regards political settlement.

## Saudi Arabia saves Mujahideen schools

The Saudi Arabian ambassador to Pakistan, Yusef Mohammad Motabbakani, has announced that his country will give \$7.5 million for educational programs of the AIG, and \$40 million for reconstruction in Afghanistan.

Motabbakani made the announcements at a news conference at his residence in Islamabad on October 30, in the presence of Prof. Mujaddidi, Prof. Rabbani and Mawlawi Mohammadi.

The money earmarked for education will be spent to run the existing schools in exile and in Afghanistan. AIG schools were closed due to shortages of funds.

The Mujahideen leaders thanked the Saudi Government for its generous support to the Afghan people.

Elaborating on the reconstruction program, Motabbakani said the "King Fahd project for reconstruction of Afghanistan" was designed to help health, education, housing, agricultural and demining projects in the liberated areas.

The operation will cover Badakhshan, Kunar, Ningarhar, Paktia, Kandahar, Herat, Logar, Badghis, Wardak and Kapisa provinces, he said.

He said that the Saudi aid to the Afghan Mujahideen was in line with the foreign policy of his country to promote the Islamic cause.

An AIG handout says that all the Mujahideen schools which were closed due to financial problems have resumed functioning since the Saudi Government provided the funds. It is a good news not only for several thousand children but for their teachers who had not received any wages for several months.

**AFGHANews**

November 15, 1991

**SIBGHATULLAH MOJADDIDI**, 66; President of the Peshawar provisional Mujahideen government. Born into a prestigious religious family in Afghanistan. Taught at Kabul University. A reformer, he belongs to the moderate Mujahideen wing. Was to have led the delegation to Moscow, but was stopped by comrades-in-arms and Pakistani secret service.

NEW TIMES  
47.91

# No Pak nationality for Afghan refugees

F.P. Bureau Report

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan has told the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) that it cannot grant citizenship to about 3.3 million Afghan refugees, official sources said. Islamabad is confident that the Afghan refugees on Pakistan's soil would also prefer to return to their homeland in due course of time, the source added.

It may be recalled that the UNHCR chief, in a letter to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in July this year, had suggested that those Afghan refugees, who would or could not return to Afghanistan, would be given Pakistan's nationality. The key subject of the letter was the UNHCR decision to further reduce its aid for the Afghan refugees based in Pakistan. The suggestion said, "it was clear that a certain number of Afghan refugees are not likely to return to Afghanistan even if there was peace in that country, adding that this number would be much greater if hopes for a political solution were not realised. The high commissioner suggested that planning be started to provide for their (Afghan refugees) legal integration. According to the UNHCR chief in Pakistan, the legal integration meant Pakistani nationality to those Afghan refugees who would or could not return to Afghanistan."

According to the source, Pakistan's rejection to the UNHCR proposal came last month at a high level conference in Geneva. The conference discussed the affairs of the refugees the world over and the UNHCR assistance to such displaced people. The conference was also attended by Pakistan.

Pakistan has reminded the UNHCR that according to an agreement which it signed with Islamabad, the UNHCR was morally bound to continue to provide assistance to Afghan refugees till they find the required conditions to return to Afghanistan.

Islamabad has also told the UNHCR that the influx of the Afghan refugees still continues due to unabated war in Afghanistan.

According to the source, 40,000 Afghan refugees entered Pakistan from Khost before the fall of that province to Afghan mujahideen. There are reports that few thousand Afghan refugees have already returned to Afghanistan recently. UNHCR has already reduced its assistance to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and there will be further reduction next year when many of the UNHCR programmes for the Afghan refugees

in Pakistan will be closed down.

Initially, the UNHCR financial assistance for Afghan refugees in Pakistan was over 200 million dollars annually, but now it has been decreased to about 20 million dollars only.

The U.N. official sources here are of the view that about 90 per cent cut in UNHCR aid to Afghan refugees is due to the overall Afghan policy of the donor countries. These donors have slashed their financial assistance to the UNHCR which forced it to reduce its aid, they added.

The U.N. source further said that not only aid for Afghan refugees has been reduced, but the reconstruction and rehabilitation projects inside Afghanistan by the UNHCR have also been abandoned. Fifty-seven such projects were to be initiated by the UNHCR this year, the source added.

The source said that the donor countries, in a recent meeting of the UNHCR in Geneva, made it clear that they would not pool funds for the Afghan refugees any more.

The cut in aid by the UNHCR to Afghan refugees has not only put Pakistan under a difficult financial situation, but it has also caused unemployment among the local skilled and non-skilled, particularly in Balochistan and NWFP.

NO. I DON'T WANT  
PAK NATIONALITY. JUST  
GIMMEE ONE CARD.

NATIONAL ID CARDS  
ISSUED HERE



Following the cut in aid, Afghan refugees have started shifting to cities for jobs. Since Afghan labour is available on cheap rates, local labourers are facing job problems. "The Afghan labour is not only cheap, but they are also hard working as compared to the local," said an official of the ministry of the states and frontier region.

Such a situation when the local labourers have been replaced by the Afghan ones will soon create political problems both for the refugees as well as the government.

A large number of Afghan refugee transporters have already given a tough time to the local transporters, particularly the goods truck-owners. The interesting situation being faced by the local goods truck-owners is that Afghan trucks have much more

load capacity to transport goods from one province to another and even then their freight is less than that of local transport. The private transport for public in the NWFP and federal capital owned by Afghan refugees, on some of the intercity routes, is another source of trouble for the local transporters. The withdrawal of UNHCR assistance will further add to the financial problems of Pakistan as it will have to meet the requirements of the bread and butter of those Afghan refugees, who are not in a position to run any kind of business. Such refugees are in a greater number.

Frontier Post 11/2

An excerpt from "Afghanistan: Resistance to Assistance" by Michael Keating in the Nov. 1991 issue of GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE.

NGOs have been instrumental in supporting refugees since 1979 and some (known as cross-border NGOs) have been providing medical and agricultural aid for years in resistance-controlled areas. The UN relied heavily upon their staff and experience for its own cross-border activities. NGOs had also kept the cause of the mujaheddin alive abroad. Indeed, many were established by Western governments specifically to provide support to the resistance against the Soviets, and are now compelled to reassess their roles. But they do not have the capacity to undertake large-scale economic and social rehabilitation and reconstruction projects.

Thus, as the military stalemate has dragged on, the ambitious plans set out in 1988 have become less and less realistic. Squabbling between the NGO community and the UN system has increased, as has in-fighting between sister UN agencies. The result has been deep frustration on all sides.

The UN has been unable to promote a centrally co-ordinated effort in which the different skills of UN, NGO and local Afghan organisations could be put to effective use. NGOs, almost exclusively based in Pakistan, continue to work with the rural resistance; UN agencies

find themselves sometimes reluctantly on 'both sides'; and donors continue to view the aid effort in the light of overall political objectives — for some, to remove the Kabul Government; for others, to maintain it.

The casualty of this confusion has been a strategy for the successful implementation of aid. The problem of providing economic and humanitarian assistance in a way that promotes self-sufficiency rather than dependency, healthy competition rather than open conflict, has not been seriously addressed. UN and NGO agencies each have their own philosophies, so there is little consensus on how much emphasis should be placed on relief, rehabilitation and longer-term development activities. To cap it all, the money is drying up. . . .

Only when peace comes can full-scale reconstructions proceed in Afghanistan in a co-ordinated manner. Only then will the refugees consider it safe to go home. And even when peace comes, a reconstruction programme will have to take into account the fragmentation of authority in rural Afghanistan. This will remain a reality for a long time. Any future government — whether it be moderate, communist or Islamic — is certain to remain severely limited for many years to come. . . .



*Out with Russian, in with French in Afghan schools*

# Reading among the ruins

By Ahmed Rashid in Kabul

At the once grand but now dreary, ramshackle Malalai School for Girls, the students say they have at least one thing to cheer about: no more Russian. "We are learning French. Thank god we don't have to learn Russian anymore," says Farzana, a 16-year-old student. She says all the other 2,600 girls who study here agree with her.

Within the past year education in Afghanistan, with one of the lowest literacy rates in the world, has undergone a dramatic change. For as the Soviet troops finally left the country in February 1989, so did the Russian education syllabus, the forced use of the Russian language and the heavy indoctrination of Marxism-Leninism.

Cut off from international aid and short of all resources, Afghan women are leading the way in trying to bring their country's children into the modern age. But in a poignant twist of history, the recasting of Afghanistan's education system often means a return to the textbooks and ideas of the long-gone era of King Zahir Shah. The swapping of Russian for French — the language of prestige in the days of the monarchy — by the girls at the Malalai School in the centre of Kabul is a case in point.

For 13 years Afghans have been at war; the Marxist coup of 1978 began the violence and a year later the Soviet Union invaded. The violence has been relentless ever since. Peace is still far away, but the regime of President Najibullah is attempting to break with this past and reach a settlement with the mujahideen guerillas based in Pakistan. Through all these embattled years, education — who controls it and how that influence is manifest — has been both a lightning rod for the combatants and a reflection of the ideological warfare.

Within weeks of the 1978 coup, for instance, crude Marxist cadres began a mass literacy campaign that forced many Afghan women, draped in veils and the daughters of conservative tribal families, into classrooms with male teachers. Their male relatives rebelled, killed many teachers, destroyed the schools and then fled with their families into Pakistan.

After the Soviet invasion, the changes

in the education system continued as the Soviets imported vast numbers of Russian-language books and syllabuses for teachers. Classrooms were revamped in the Soviet image with little concern for Afghan traditions or culture.

Now the Soviets are gone and the first article of the country's new educational policy spells out the change. The government "will pay careful attention to the healthy training of children in light of the principles of the holy religion of Islam, the people's approved traditions and national reconciliation in the country."

Even though Islamic classes have been doubled from one hour a week to two hours a week, the change is more dramatic in other fields. The entire curriculum for subjects like history, literature and the social sciences has been changed to eliminate all references to the coup or socialism. Studying Russian, which was compulsory for all students, has been dropped in favour of English or French. Hamoura Saleem Baber, the principal of the Malalai School, says that textbooks from the time of King Shah, who was deposed in 1973, have been pulled out of storage — and textbooks used during the past decade have been put into storage.

Many schools do not have the old textbooks so they cross out by hand all the references to party history, communism and anything to do with the past decade," she says. In fact, Afghanistan has no paper and no resources to print new textbooks even though the Ministry of Education has already devised many of them. "The history of Afghanistan comes to an end in 1978 because we do not have the material to teach about the recent past realistically," says a history teacher at the school.

But students seem pleased. A 10th-grade student named Larwana, for one, says: "We learn about the world instead of just about the Soviet Union."

The Malalai School, which used to be one of the most prestigious French style schools or *lycée* in Kabul, was founded in 1938 and was one of the first schools to educate girls. Now the imposing building is falling apart: chairs are jerry-rigged from packing cases; there are no desks; the walls of the classrooms have no paint; teachers have no supplemental materials and hardly any

science laboratory equipment or chemicals for carrying out experiments. In the days of Soviet control, bright students in the higher grades were immediately shipped out to Soviet Central Asia to continue their studies.

Women are taking the lead in reviving the education system of the country under Education Minister Masouma Ismati Wardak, who is struggling with a pitiful education budget of Af 3.6 billion (US\$3.1 million) that is being reduced every day by inflation. "We are short of everything but we are managing," she says.

"The war has reaped a horrible harvest in education," she says. Some 2,000 schools have been destroyed, 2,100 teachers killed and some 15,000 teachers have fled the country. Many of them, especially teachers in higher education, are now driving taxis in New York or Peshawar. "The main job now is to train enough teachers for when peace comes."

In 1987, Afghanistan's literacy rate was around 12%. Today Western aid experts put it at around 27%, but, they say, most literate Afghans are found in the urban areas, where schools exist and the regime's control is the strongest. Some 5 million Afghans out of a total population of 18 million have left the country and huge swathes of territory are without administration or a single school.

The mujahideen parties based in Pakistan have set up schools, but these are almost entirely confined to learning the Koran and basic literacy. A few independent Afghan women in Peshawar started private schools for girls along more modern lines, but they were threatened and forced to close down by the mullas who run the refugee camps.

In the mountains, though, guerilla field commanders have been more enterprising. Commanders such as Ahmed Shah Masud in the north and Ismael Khan in the west have used French and British aid to set up a rudimentary school system for local villagers. But now, in the highly complex world of changing alliances since the Soviet troops departed, the government is providing teachers to the guerillas. Hundreds of male teachers, many of them trained in Kabul, have been sent up to the mountains to run guerilla schools. They are paid their salaries by the government, but owe their first loyalty to the guerilla leaders.

This peculiar set-up is part of the complicated process of what Kabul claims is its "national reconciliation policy," in which, even if there is no overall peace plan, there are dozens of areas where government of-



ficials and the guerillas work clandestinely together to survive. At a recent educational conference sponsored by UNICEF, guerilla leaders arrived in Kabul to attend.

Wardak's own 27 years of teaching experience is a reflection of how the great divides in Afghan society have often shifted. Before the war she taught the wife of Pir Ahmad Gailani, one of the prominent moderate leaders among the Afghan mujahideen in Pakistan. She also taught their daughter, Fatima Gailani, who now heads the mujahideen office in London. Wardak, who grew up in a small village and had to fight with her father to be educated, is now 61 and has taught many of the country's famous women.

Even as Kabul liberalises its education system, many Afghans say there is still the problem of the enormous gulf between the fundamentalist mujahideen and the educated residents in cities like Kabul. Bridging that gap is going to create enormous social problems as there is now an entire generation of Afghans who have grown up in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran who do not know Afghanistan. Many of them have been indoctrinated with the idea that all city dwellers are closet communists.

As international diplomatic efforts intensify for a peaceful solution to the bitter and long war, Afghanistan's children will remain one of the most deprived groups of children anywhere. Both in Kabul and the refugee camps in Pakistan, there is hardly a child who has not lost a relative or friend in the war. Teenagers have either become gun-toting guerillas or soldiers in the Afghan army and violence for many has become a way of life. For many years to come Afghanistan's classrooms will still have to cope with the social and psychological aftermath of a horrendous war. ■

## Afghanistan and the 'new Soviet Union'

The recent game of bringing the Afghan issue to the negotiating table is yet another attempt to impose on the Afghans what may not suit them. The announcement made by Moscow and Washington about stopping arms delivery by next January to all parties of Afghanistan virtually gives the advantage to the Kabul regime of Najibullah, whose removal is not a condition anymore for America. For both Moscow and Washington any secular government other than the 'fundamentalist' *Mujahideen* is welcome. The arms already possessed by Najibullah and any further supply he receives by next January would enable him to fight the resistance for some time in order to delay the finding of any democratic solution which may eventually go in favour of the present Afghan regime. As the so-called superpowers are not at loggerheads any more, they would certainly try to use UN resolutions to settle the Afghan issue as they did against Iraq. So, it is not unusual to find that the *Mujahideen* will not yield to the UN or any other mediation in the presence of the Najibullah regime. Washington has long before stopped supplying arms to the Afghan resistance through Pakistan. The political change in Pakistan and its decision to build a nuclear bomb has also changed Washington's policy towards Pakistan.

The fact is, that after the failed Moscow coup, Najibullah himself wants to form an agreement with all parties of Afghanistan, as he is not sure how the unpredictable changes in Moscow will affect his government and himself personally. Although he has changed his rhetoric and become more Afghan nationalist than a socialist, the differences with his government are increasing. Only the generals loyal to him are holding his power base. His persecution and imprisonment of dissidents goes on unabated. This is one of the main reasons why the refugees do not want to go back to Afghanistan. For them it is a very hard choice to make when their own brothers and sisters are being killed from both sides and being pushed into a miserable life.

It seems that the solution to the Afghan problem is not going the way that international negotiators wanted it to. Now, it is the Afghans themselves who have to find a solution for their own destiny. Any third party, preferably any international team, can play the role of a caretaker that would not interfere in the transformation of the new Afghan government.

Of course when nations live together there are bound to be differences and there must also be ways to find solutions. But it is regrettable that the differences among the factional groups of the Afghan *Mujahideen* are increasing, and they will continue to increase and more blood will be shed as long as the problems remain unsolved.

*Soviet Muslims Brief, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1991*

19 DECEMBER 1991

FEER

### MORE EVENTS

The REFUGEE STUDIES PROGRAMME, Queen Elizabeth House, Univ. of Oxford, 21 St. Giles, Oxford OX1 3LA, held a course on "The Mental Health of Refugee Children Exposed to Violent Environments" from January 6-10. The organization's next course will address "Psychosocial Adaptation of Refugees" and will be held from April 6-10. The registration deadline is March 1. The course fee is £375 which includes University bed & breakfast accommodation.

The REFUGEE STUDIES PROGRAMME Int'l Summer School will be held from July 6-31 and will cover Int'l refugee law, assistance agencies & refugee

societies, managing refugee assistance & the psychological & social aspects of forced migration. The course fee is £1650, which includes 27 days bed & breakfast accommodation, course materials, & RSP social activities. The registration deadline is 31 May.

Juliene Lipson & Pat Omidian presented a paper on "The Afghan Refugee Family: Traditions & Transitions in the United States" at the AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION meeting in Chicago, Nov. 23.



From the Editor:

1992 brings the 20th anniversary of this publication. We are proud of our longevity & extremely grateful to our subscribers, whose interest is what keeps us going.

The FORUM exists solely on subscriptions, which cover printing & mailing costs. Everything else is volunteer. (You couldn't pay us to do this!) Since most subscriptions expire with this issue, we hope you will continue to desire your bi-monthly dose of Afghan news, opinion & gossip - in spite of a \$5 rate hike. If a tan form is enclosed with your copy of this issue, you owe us money; we hope you will renew promptly.

Our annual disclaimer: We include what's been written, printed, said & planned about Afghans & Afghanistan. You can believe it or not. Names & places are spelled as they appeared in the item cited, unless the spelling was too undecipherable.

We have no crystal ball but recent events in some of the areas surrounding Afghanistan lead us to believe that 1992 may offer lots of interesting reading material. If you come across any, please send us a copy - legible copies, please, with the name & date of issue of the publication. We are dependent on our readers for information, as well as subscriptions. (As we said, this is a volunteer effort.)

Thanks to all of you who contributed to this issue - and to everyone who sent information during the past year. Please, please, keep it up.

The deadline for the next issue is March 5.



## EVENTS

The AFGHAN REFUGEE FUND is sponsoring a series of fundraising parties to celebrate Mulla Nasrudin's birthday. All proceeds will go to help Afghan refugees.


Date:	Place:	Contact:
2-22 *	New York, NY	Ron Barney, 212-595-6235
2-22 *	Washington, DC	Steve Whitney, 301-270-4679
2-29 *	Chapel Hill, NC	Peter Battis, 919-933-5675
2-29 *	Chicago, IL	Herman & Alice Schaefer, 708-587-8407
4-11 *	San Francisco, CA	Dave Sassee, 408-353-4250
4-11 *	Ukiah, CA	Ned Walsh, 707-462-2384

### NASHENAS CONCERTS

1/19 - The former director of Radio Afghani-star will perform in Washington, D.C. at Lisner Auditorium, George Washington Univ., at 8 p.m. Call 703-491-9848 for ticket information.

2/15 - Dr. Moh'd Sadiq Fitrat, alias Nashenas, will sing at Zellerbach Hall, Univ. of California, Berkeley at 8 p.m. Tickets available from the Cal Performance box office, 510-642-9988, or in selected Bay Area stores. Call Fast Stop, 510-786-1092 for local ticket outlets.

2/16 - This concert will take place at Sexson Auditorium, Pasadena City College at 6 p.m. Contact Riga at 714-364-4302 for ticket information.



Nashenas: harmonium, vocals

Chetram Sahnr: tabla, dolak  
Mohammed Quraishi: rabob, dolak  
Salam Rahmani: sitar, tanpura  
Steve Gorn: bansuri flute

For further information  
contact Mark Ginsburg,  
212-226-2140 or 212-  
219-2571.

# US 'using' Russia: POWs release part of package settlement: Iran warned

PT Bureau

PESHAWAR, Nov. 27: The Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Victor Yakunine, today met Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, Acting Foreign Minister of Interim Government of Afghan mujahideen and Gulbadin Hikmatyar, chief of Hizbe Islami, here separately.

The meeting with Rabbani was held in the IGA presidency in University Town with Hikmatyar at the latter's residence.

The talks focussed on issues of mutual interest, especially the recent Moscow talks between mujahideen and the Soviet authorities.

The Soviet envoy was pleased with the results of the Moscow talks and welcomed mujahideen's measures to establish the joint committee envisioned in the joint communique.

Rabbani called the Moscow talks successful and noted the drastic changes taking place in Moscow. He said mujahideen and the world were looking forward to practical steps from the Soviet side.

The Soviet and Russian authorities face an international challenge to prove sincerity of their new approach to international relations by implementing the provisions of the joint communique, he added.

The Soviet Ambassador discussed with Hikmatyar the current developments in Afghanistan problem.

The Political Consul of the Soviet Embassy Mr. Carpov accompanied the Soviet envoy.

Hikmatyar told Mr. Yakunine that the number of mujahideen POWs held by the Soviet Union and the puppet regime of Kabul was more than the Soviet POWs. He said that if the Soviet Union released the list of the Afghan POWs the mujahideen would also do so.

He said that the fate of hundreds of thousands of Afghans made prisoners by the Soviet Army during their occupation of Afghanistan was not certain even.

Hekmatyar told the Soviet Ambassador that the release of

POWs was related to the package settlement of the Afghanistan problem.

Later addressing a Press conference, Hikmatyar reiterated the pledge that Afghan mujahideen would never bow down before any pressure from any side until an Islamic government was formed in accordance with the wishes of the people of Afghanistan.

Hikmatyar said that it was mainly due to Moscow-Washington collusion coupled with Western conspiracies that Najib government still existed.

He was of the view that Moscow was prepared to stop military assistance to Kabul but it was the Washington pressure that Moscow had resumed military weapons supply. He said that the ever biggest chunk of weapons given to Kabul by Moscow was supplied by the USA.

Hikmatyar opined that Kabul government would have collapsed by now had it not enjoyed Washington's blessings and not received US aid through Moscow.

He said that 40 to 50 Soviet planes loaded with ammunition were landing at Khawaja Rawesh airport daily.

He said that Moscow was not sincere and serious about the settlement of the Afghan issue and that Moscow interested only in the release of Soviet POWs.

Hikmatyar regretted that Iran had chosen a special section and supplied relief assistance by air. He said that by so doing Iran was helping Najib government "charged that Iran tried to act as a mediator in the move of formation of coalition between the nationalists and communists.

He said that Iran had convinced this special sect not to fight against Najib and coordinate in the move.

He said that if Iran followed such a policy it would be its mistake. He hoped that Iran would refrain from such misdoings as these could be interpreted as interference in Afghanistan.

He said that Afghan problem would be settled only if Kabul regime went unconditionally.

PT 11/28

# Afghan rebels free 3 Soviet prisoners

ISLAMABAD: The Afghan resistance announced yesterday it had released three Soviet soldiers captured during the Afghan War.

"They are now free," Burhanuddin Rabbani, chief of the moderate fundamentalist Jamiat-e-Islami and one of the main leaders of the Afghan guerillas based in Pakistan, said. The three men, all from Uzbekistan, were identified as Mr Mohammed Nasser, Mr Rustam Baig and Mr Abdul Qasim.

Rabbani said they would be handed over to a joint commission due to be formed soon by the Commonwealth of Independent States and the guerillas.

If there were delays, "we will send them to their parents".

Mr Nasser was taken prisoner south of Kabul seven years ago, Mr Baig was captured in 1984 at Shakardara, and Mr Qasim

was captured in 1986 in Paghman province, he said.

The guerillas are expecting the Government of President General Najibullah in Kabul to free 90 Mujahideen in exchange for the three soldiers, Rabbani said.

He also said the former soldier freed in Pakistan at the end of the visit of Russian Vice-President Mr Alexandre Rutskoi was from Turkmenistan and had been forced to enlist in Kabul's militia.

"He's not an Afghan," Rabbani said, rejecting accusations of deceit made by members of a Russian delegation in Kabul.

Relations between the Afghan resistance and Moscow have recently worsened with both sides accusing the other of not respecting promises made during the visit of a guerilla delegation to the Russian capital in November.

Agence France Presse

SCMP 12/27



Cartoons not otherwise attributed are from unknown Kabul sources.

# EXPEDITIONS 1992

Just west of here a little way, in *Valley Kingdoms of the North*, a brazen statement is found: "There are places that on a good day can be compared to it, but no place is more beautiful than Hunza." Since I wrote those words a couple of years ago, no one has petitioned for their removal, and if they did they'd be in for a fight. I've grown pretty tiresome over the years telling people "this is a place you *must* see."

Not long ago our friend Iqbal Walji told me much the same thing about a different place. He mentioned Afghanistan and I wondered why people were so eager to go there, now that the Russians had left. "Oh, Tom," Iqbal said, "Afghanistan is a *wonderful* destination. You should go there." And so I will, *if*: the political situation allows (we won't run our *Khyber Pass* trip until the all-clear has sounded loud and convincingly. The same is true for our Iran trip, by the way), and *if*: I can convince Ms. Ann Aylwin, our Pakistan-Afghanistan Country Director, that I'm the guy for the job. (I *have* been into the Khyber to within a couple of miles of Afghanistan, and it was one of the most electric things I've done, ever.)

Tom Cole

## The Khyber Pass Into Afghanistan

Like the Grand Canyon and the Taj Mahal, the Khyber Pass exceeds the high expectations laid on it by legend. A 30-mile-long defile slashed through dry and jagged rock, the Pass buzzes with drama. "Ground into its dust," James Spain writes in *The Way of the Pathans*, "is Persian gold, Greek iron, Tatar leather, Mogul gems, Afghan silver, and British steel."

The Khyber's history hasn't slowed, and as we make this journey—if we make it; see the introduction to this section—we'll be passing through lands just freed from the grasp of yet another failed conqueror.

The Pass lies in Pakistan's Tribal Areas, which begin not far from the North West Frontier capital of Peshawar. This is emphatically Pathan country, and no traveler comes through here without an almost dazed respect for these resolute people. We cross into Afghanistan at the western end of the Pass and continue to Kabul, and after a day there, deep into the Hindu Kush at Bamiyan.

Now we head north, over Shiber and Salan passes, overnighing at Pul-i-Khumri, driving through riveting, uncompromising mountain and desert scenery, up to Mazar-e-Sharif. Thirty-five miles from here is the bridge across the Amu Darya that the last Russian troops crossed into Soviet Uzbekistan, and safety.

Days 1 & 2: en route to Islamabad ■ Day 3: Islamabad ■ Day 4: drive to Peshawar ■ Day 5: Peshawar ■ Day 6: across the Khyber Pass to Kabul ■ Day 7: Kabul ■ Day 8: fly to Bamiyan ■ Day 9: Bamiyan ■ Day 10: drive to Pul-i-Khumri via Shiber Pass and Salan Pass ■ Day 11: drive to Mazar-e-Sharif via Tashkhan ■ Day 12: Mazar-e-Sharif ■ Day 13: fly to Kabul ■ Day 14: drive to Peshawar ■ Day 15: fly to Islamabad for flight home ■ Day 16: return to USA.

9/18/92 - 10/3/92

## INNERASIA EXPEDITIONS

2627 LOMBARD STREET  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94123  
USA

George Doubleday II, [800] 777-8183  
Chairman

Landcost  
From  
\$2990

## DRUG TRAFFICKING IS THRIVING IN IRAN

Crackdown by Government,  
Fails to Stop Smugglers  
Along Afghan Border

By KATAYON GHAZI  
Special to The New York Times

ZAHDAN, Iran — Reza Ali says he has tired of waiting for peace in his native Afghanistan. One trip to Meshed, Iran's second-largest city, could have secured his future.

But the ambitions of the 21-year-old Mr. Ali were dashed by a life sentence for drug smuggling. The authorities in Zاهدان not far from the Afghan border arrested him last month and found that he had swallowed 15 plastic-wrapped packs totaling 1½ pounds of heroin before making the trip.

"His pale complexion was typical of the hundreds who traffic narcotics in this manner," Mahmoud Tayerani, a prosecutor's assistant, said of the arrest that led to Mr. Ali's apparent confession. "In Meshed, the heroin would sell for nine times its street value here."

Drug trafficking along Iran's border — the chosen thoroughfare of smugglers in the "Golden Crescent" stretching across Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran — is thriving as a result of the chaos of the long-running Afghan civil war, the area's uncontrollable borders and widespread poverty.

In response, Teheran's Islamic revolutionary Government has made the trade a major front in its stepped-up campaign against "bands of seditionaries" in eastern Iran three years after the end of its war with Iraq.

Iran's Disciplinary Forces, known by the Persian acronym NAJA, have faced off here against the Baluchis, the fiercely independent tribal people of traditional Baluchistan straddling Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The 1.5 million Baluchis in Iran are mainly Sunni Muslims, not Shiites like most Iranians. Baluchis engaged in the highly profitable drug trade do so with the blessing of Baluchi clerics who have decreed its "Islamic legitimacy."

Iranian officials have declined to give figures of casualties on both sides, though they are believed to be substantial. About 1,600 smugglers and 15,000 addicts were arrested during a September crackdown. Seventy-three traffickers convicted by revolutionary courts were promptly executed. State-run newspapers have reported a yearly average of 600 executions nationwide since the death penalty for smugglers was implemented in 1988.

### Nature a Collaborator

A band commanding fear and fame is led by 36-year-old Nur-Mohamad Naroi. Locals like to exchange stories



of his riches; for his fifth marriage he supposedly bought a child bride for \$200,000.

A primary source of the narcotics is the fields of poppies along the Helmand River in Afghanistan, which are secured by guerrilla commanders or their opponents, Afghan Government troops.

"The walls and barriers get washed away with the rain," an officer explained, adding that "the Baluchis have nature as their collaborator."

Zاهدان's freewheeling business climate is strained daily through a variety of official intimidation tactics, including commandos stationed at the bazaar square and public hangings of drug traffickers during morning rush hour.

The Baluchi representative in Parliament, Massoud Hashem Zehi, recently accused the founders of Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution of "irrational behaviors and aggressiveness" toward Baluchis in their anti-drug effort.

Officials said that in the 1970's the late Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, reached an agreement with Baluchi clans in which drug smuggling would be abandoned in exchange for cash Government benefits.

But between 1979 and 1981, revolutionary courts in Zاهدان meted out harsh sentences, including executions of tribal chiefs. That antagonized some Baluchi clans, causing their migration to Pakistan. Attempts at reconciliation with Baluchis failed.

The daily newspaper Ettelat reported in January 1989 that narcotics confiscations rose from 1,600 pounds in 1975 to 112,000 pounds in 1985.

Iranian radio last year put the number of addicts at 800,000, an estimate disputed as too low by doctors in Teheran, Meshed and Zاهدان, where drug abuse is rampant.

NYT 12/24

The Russian Federation and other republics within the new Commonwealth of Independent States have agreed to honor all agreements made by the old Soviet government, including the ones on Afghanistan.

Rocky Mountain News Jan. 6, 1992

# OPINION

The following is taken from an ACTION MEMORANDUM ON AFGHANISTAN prepared by Barnett R. Rubin for the Int'l Negotiation Network Consultation at the Carter Center of Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, January 15-17, 1992:

Finally, all of these other efforts [to reconcile Afghan society into a viable state] will go for nought without a program of assistance aimed at helping the Afghan state & society create an economic system that both sustains them & makes the state accountable to society. The simplest thing a future government might do would be to invite multinational corporations to upgrade the technology in the natural gas fields, develop new products & markets for the gas, & explore & exploit other parts of Afghanistan's vast mineral resource potential. Such measures might provide a quick fix for the state's fiscal crisis, but they bring with them great political risks. As shown by not only Afghanistan's past experience but that of countries as diverse as Iran, Nigeria & Zaire, a state dependent on a single extracted export can develop symptoms of gigantism & unaccountability. The ruler enriches the state & himself from his deals with those whose technology extracts the wealth, not through negotiation with his own people. The end is often corruption & collapse.

The overall problem, as pointed out by Afghan anthropologist Ashraf Ghani, is to create institutions to make the Afghan government accountable to its own people for the use of foreign aid & create a fiscal basis for the state that links it to the society. This will decrease the risk of a descent into armed conflict over access to the resources provided for reconstruction, a real possibility which has already happened in some pockets within the country. For instance, noting that the key problem of agriculture in Afghanistan is water, Ghani has suggested the establishment of water management institutions subject to councils elected by all those using water from a common river basin. Similar councils could be set up to regulate the use of pasturage, especially if, as Ghani also suggests, the int'l community helps the Afghan nomads (about one seventh of the population) turn their pastoral economy into a commercial enterprise supplying meat & dairy products to their pasture-poor neighbors throughout the region.

At this point the problem of making & sustaining the peace shades off into that of development. This development will occur in a region whose entire economic & political structure is liable to be transformed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan could become the center of a free trade zone including Pakistan, Iran, Turkey & Central Asia, or it might become the nucleus of a vast arena of conflict recalling the hundred-years war leading to the formation of the European state system. There are limits to what those outside this region can do to affect this process. But when we are tempted to ignore it, we would do well to recall the words of Moh'd Iqbal, the poet philosopher who invented the idea of Pakistan:

Āsiyā yak pīkar-e āb-o-gel ast;  
Mellat-e Afghān dar ān chū del ast.  
Az gashād-e-ū gashād-e Āsiyā;  
Az fasād-e-ū fasād-e Āsiyā.

"Asia," he wrote, "is body of water & mud," the substances from which God created mankind. "The Afghan nation is in its midst like a heart. From its good fortune comes the good fortune of Asia; from its corruption comes the corruption of Asia."



AFGHAN ECONOMIC CRISES: THE SOVIET CONNECTION by M. Siddieq Noorzoy, Emeritus Professor of Economics.

The US-Soviet joint statement of 9/13/91 on Afghanistan and the 11/16/91 joint communique by a delegation of some of the mujahideen groups & the former Soviet government in Moscow left an important aspect of Soviet-Afghan relations untouched. Over the years, the former Soviet government supplied more than arms to Afghanistan. To serve their own & their client's needs, the Soviets printed excessive supplies of Afghanis, the Afghan currency, & flooded the Afghan economy. The obvious results are hyper-inflation - prices reportedly are rising at the rate of 500% a year - & the over 22-fold depreciation of the Afghani in terms of the US dollar. The current economic crises in Afghanistan can be directly attributed to Soviet economic policies toward Afghanistan & their acceptance by the Kabul regime.

Ironically, the former Soviet economy & now the economies of the Commonwealth of Independent States suffer from similar conditions of hyper-inflation & foreign exchange shortages, albeit for entirely different reasons. However, this caused the former Soviet government to demand US dollars from Afghanistan for payments for imports instead of the traditional practice of accepting Afghanis or Rubles - which have been subject to rapidly declining values, with over 1200 & 100 to the dollar respectively.

War time conditions in Afghanistan have resulted in drastic shortages, especially from the farms. But it is clear that the conditions of hyper-inflation leading to extreme consumer hardships, particularly in Kabul & other urban areas, & the foreign exchange crisis in the country as a whole are the results of uncontrolled increases in the money supply.

Historically, the experiences of other countries show that such hyper-inflation & foreign exchange shortages cannot be controlled by the usual tools of monetary policy without a major currency reform. In Afghanistan what is needed is a wholesale substitution of the present currency with a new currency guaranteed by a new government with the help of the IMF & the World Bank.

Despite any political agreements for the resolution of the military & political problems in the country, the current economic crises will continue to worsen without a currency reform. No new government can function under the present conditions. The sooner this problem is taken under advisement, the sooner the situation could be reversed. Without currency reform, refugee resettlement & reconstruction in Afghanistan will be impossible.

\* \* \*

REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE & CAUSES OF THE WAR by Paul Overby. Paul Overby spent most of 1988 in Peshawar & inside Afghanistan; his book Holy Blood is a personal account & interpretation of the war. He imagines this piece as a proposal against which Forum readers can match their own experience.

Current opinion seems to be that the Afghan war is no longer a war of ideology & has become a war of tradition. "De-ideologization" & "re-traditionalization," the terms associated with this interpretation, come from Olivier Roy & the 2nd edition of his important book, Islam and Resistance. I would like to suggest that the war was never particularly ideological & that the description "traditional" masks fundamental changes that are anything but traditional.

Not surprisingly, Roy, the leading scholar of the war, has had a major role in shaping these interpretations. In the 1st edition of Islam & Resistance, the war was seen (among other things) as a conflict between communism & what Roy called

"Islamism." <sup>1</sup> Islamism, a type of "fundamentalism," is a revolutionary religious-political ideology whose Afghan version grew up in the 1960s under the direct influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamism turns religion into politics, rejects the existing setup as corrupt & aims for a Koran-based ideology that will rival both East & West.

The earlier Roy apparently saw in Islamism the hope of the Resistance & of Afghanistan since it held out the possibility of finally unifying the Resistance & the country. The hollowness of that hope was revealed by the Soviet withdrawal in February, 1989. In March, the mujahideen failed to take Jalalabad; as spring turned into summer the Afghan Interim Gov't still refused to jell; & in July a number of Massoud's allies were ambushed by a Hezb Hekmatyar commander in Takhar. The removal of the Soviet bogeyman threw into high relief the already-existing fissures among Resistance groups.

The Soviet withdrawal exposed the real nature of the conflict. It became clear that their invasion had not been an attempt to grab land or punish Islam, but primarily an armed intervention to support a friendly gov't that was involved in a civil war over the shape of Afghan society. As Frances Fitzgerald said of a parallel war, "The Vietnamese...were engaged in a struggle to create a nation & to adapt a largely traditional society to the modern world. By backing one contender...the United States was...entering into a moral & ideological struggle over the form of the state & the goals of society." <sup>2</sup> But there was at least one great difference between Vietnam & Afghanistan: the Vietnamese communists had a much clearer idea of the society they wanted to create.

\* \* \*

When I was in Peshawar in the summer of 1988, Anwar Khan of the University of Peshawar told me that Afghanistan had been lost by the intellectuals & was being won back by the farmers. In this sense, February 1989 was not a vindication of the forward-facing Islamists (who, according to Roy, were revolutionary city types naturally at odds with old-fashioned mullahs & ulama religious scholars), but a triumph for the querulous, honor-obsessed, narrow-minded, tax-hating traditionalists of the valleys & villages. In the war between old & new, (the revised) Roy was right: old was indeed winning.

At this point, the conservative nature of the war seems beyond dispute; we can wonder how anyone thought it was "ideological." The fighting started, of course, as a violent protest against radical reforms; it was essentially reactionary. Inside Afghanistan the average mujahid foot-soldier is a hard-handed farmer who could care less about policy points being made in Islamist bureaus. The real center of gravity has always been inside Afghanistan, not in Peshawar; it's just that, apart from a few big-name commanders, "inside" never had a voice or anything to say. As Naeem Majrooh says, the success of the Resistance has been military: the failure of the political side & the relative unimportance of the political leadership in Peshawar are shown by its extreme fragmentation. In spite of its fragmentation, the military side could succeed by sheer doggedness. (And because it was in pursuit of specific, usually short-term, objectives.)

The war was founded in Islam, & for the most part Islam is not progressive. "The most conservative expressions of society are ordinarily religious," as Gary Wills says. <sup>3</sup> (Islamism, like liberation theology, is an exception.) When I went inside Afghanistan in 1988, the Islamic ribs of the war were always visible & in Peshawar, Islam had gained new currency among former liberals who were now seeking favor in the eyes of the fundamentalist parties.

The war was conservative; the fundamentalists or Islamists were only hitchhiking on the war. The real religious impulse was not & is not fundamentalist. It is traditionalist. The old time religion that most Afghans want is not the gleaming, threatening Islamist version, but the comfortable, custom-encrusted kind that they're used to.

The Islamists inherited the mantle of resistance by default at the time of the Saur revolution. All the other leadership groups had eliminated themselves. The ineffectiveness of the regimes associated with Zahir Shah & Daoud & the failure of the constitutional period had seriously weakened the whole establishment: king & royal family, allied groups among the sufis & ulama, westernizing liberals. The Islamists, & the Islamists alone, were not touched. The Islamists raised the cry of "Islam in danger!" & fought the PDPA in the streets of Kabul. Although their ideas had never been shown to have any popularity among average Afghans, the Islamists became leaders by default. Even then, they made little progress in winning hearts & minds. When Professor Majrooh polled the refugees in 1987, 71% wanted to see Zahir Shah run the country while the Islamist party leaders received ridiculously small support, on the order of 1%. <sup>4</sup>

A prerequisite for the radical modernization attempted by the PDPA was national unity & after the Saur coup, power was sharply centralized. When Saur was rejected, centralization was also rejected. In the jig-saw puzzle of the liberated areas, the broadest area of common command is probably the northeastern area under Massoud, & cohesion even within this territory of cooperating Jamiat commanders is shaky, according to some sources. <sup>5</sup>

Underlying all this is a disconcerting Afghan fractiousness. No nation is without disagreements, jealousy, social *schadenfreude*, but it seems to me more common among the Afghans. Their incredible bickering, stomping off & prickly separatism are not an illusion. Even faced with the ugliest enemy anyone is ever likely to have, the Afghans failed to work together.

According to those who have had the most direct experience with the country, it seems that the basic unit of loyalty is geographically rather small - what Roy calls the qawm. Each village has its powerful men; these men have cliques made up of relatives & others; in a small village virtually everyone would be related somehow. I assume that Afghan society is made up of groups like these, the folks from the family who live within walking distance. And if this is true, the loyalty to some larger entity that is probably necessary to a modern political economy is simply not there. There is no country to modernize if there is no country because nobody cares.

\* \* \*

The conflict in Afghanistan is over particular issues, of course - whether girls will be taught along with boys, who controls the land in a certain corner of a certain valley - but I believe that the depth of emotion (the political emotion) that has fueled the 13-year war goes straight down to the larger conflict. The war is like a volcano along a continental rift: the volcano is only a symptom of an underlying pressure between continental plates - a symptom of a conflict in Afghanistan between two basic forms of society, Modern & Traditional. The enormous friction between these two modes of existence feeds the emotion that made the jihad. The plate of Tradition is being subducted, run over by the plate of scientific-technological Modernism.

The Afghan world is divided in many ways, but this conflict between Modern & Traditional is the most fundamental &, in my view, the basic cause & dynamic of the war. <sup>6</sup> Between the two styles of culture, one has seductive luxuries, overwhelming military power &, at its root, the virtually magic ability through science-technology to change the physical world. The other has - or had - a familiar place for its inhabitants in family, tribe & village; security in an unchanging world in which God stood at the center as the most unchanging. Traditional culture is behind, behind in everything that can be measured. And the rage to be equal is one of the most fundamental forces driving the developing world: the urge to be recognized, to have value, to have respect.

\* \* \*

So if the Old has been winning in Afghanistan, its success seems destined to be temporary. Does this view suffer from an outrageous Western bias? Consider the following:

When I was with Mullah Naqeebullah in Arghendab in April, 1988, jammed into the back of a truck as we were making one of the daily location shifts to avoid enemy attention, I noticed the young mujahid next to me. He was watching a motorcycle pass us on the road. He followed it with total absorption. His mouth was slightly open. The look on his face was awe & admiration & desire. He wanted that bike. The power, the speed, the noise! He was no different from a 19-year-old kid anywhere. Between the donkey that would have done the same job of getting him to town & the motorcycle, there was absolutely no contest.

The look on his face, so immediately comprehensible, so hard to quantify, said it all. That look is the impact of Modernity. The effect is total & pervasive & enters society's pores like desert grit in a storm. Diesel engines, video cassettes, electric lights, public health with shots, pills & surgery, plastic sandals - the Modern pressure is everywhere.

The Modernism represented by the Western liberals, the communists & the Islamists failed in Afghanistan - each in its own way. The PDPA is doomed; the liberals discredited; the reformist fundamentalists (a fine contradiction!) of the resistance are without real influence. In spite of that I do not believe that Modernism is dead. Science, technology, secularism, the money economy, intensive contact with other peoples & lands are forms that will prevail. Delays will occur but the change, it seems to me, is inevitable. That is the irony & sadness of the war; it is an incredibly valiant attempt to stop the inevitable.

If it began as an effort to prevent change (in the minds of the farmers) or to redirect change (in the minds of the Islamists), the war has now itself become the main engine of change. The country has been broken up in the mill of revolution & war. Afghanistan is between the two worlds & is being torn apart between them. The present situation is that the main powers in the war neither completely reject nor completely affirm Modernization. The fundamentalists who want science without skepticism & material comfort without corruption don't seem to realize the contradictions. That to get everything they want, the pace of events will fundamentally change, relations between people will change as objects take over, everything will change.

If the state of constantly-being-split is typical in Afghanistan, & I think it is, there may be very little chance of holding the country together. Afghans have not decided what they want & they will not stand for being told what that should be. They will fight if someone tries to tell them yet somehow they must find it. Majrooh said, "There is a way back to the lost shores of our existence: it leads straight through hell." <sup>7</sup>

Paul Overby  
Portland, Oregon  
December, 1991.

<sup>1</sup> Although I only realized the central role he had given Islamism when I read the 2nd edition.

<sup>2</sup> Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 8-9.

<sup>3</sup> Garry Wills, Reagan's America: Innocents at Home, 382.

<sup>4</sup> Afghan Information Centre, Monthly Bulletin, Peshawar, July 1987.

<sup>5</sup> Like Shah Makhmood Miakhel of VOA.

<sup>6</sup> As Eqbal Ahmad & Richard J. Barnet comment in "Bloody Games," in their New Yorker piece, "The basic split in Afghan society is not between capitalism & Communism but between traditionalism & modernism." April 11, 1988, p. 27.

<sup>7</sup> Majrooh, quoted in Michael Haller, "Die Fuehrer saeen Zwietracht unters Volk," Die Zeit, #40, Sept. 30, 1988.

The following is extracted from an article by William Maley, Lecturer in Politics, Univ. College, Univ. of New South Wales, Australia. The article appeared in AFGHANISTAN INFO #30, September 1991. Prof. Maley is concerned with what sort of constitutional order might best assist Afghanistan in the long run. He discusses several models but favors the following:

This brings us to the third and from my point of view most interesting model, namely that of **consociational democracy**. The consociational model owes its origins to the work of the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, who has been concerned to identify the structural attributes which have contributed to political stability in a number of deeply divided European societies. The consociational model has four major elements. The first and most important is government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society. The second is the mutual veto which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests. The third is proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments and allocation of public funds. The fourth is a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own affairs<sup>2</sup>.

The consociational model has had a number of successes to its credit, most notably Switzerland, Belgium, and The Netherlands, but it has also had some just as notable failures - most spectacularly Lebanon<sup>3</sup>. These failures have led to a number of specific criticisms of the model which are worth mentioning at this point. A first criticism is that it is of limited relevance to so-called 'Third World' countries<sup>4</sup>, but given the diversity of the 'Third World', this is not a very satisfactory line of inquiry. A more developed argument, put forward by Brian Barry, is that societies deeply divided on ethnic lines are unhappy candidates for consociationalism: «if there is to be a leadership of an ethnic group that is not in constant danger of being undercut by challengers, it must inevitably be seen to be taking up an extreme position in defence of the group's interests»<sup>5</sup>. This, however, assumes a particular kind of mechanism for the acquisition of leadership status, which may not apply in all cases where ethnicity is the basis of deep social divisions.

A more serious criticism of consociational democracy is that it seems to presuppose the existence of elites which can form a grand coalition, and does not properly address a situation in which significant segments of a plural society are governed not by individual leaders but by collective institutions such as a «shura» or «jirgah». As Donald L. Horowitz has written, theories «that rest on elite initiative must include variables related to group structure and competition, for these constrain the opportunities for interethnic elite relations»<sup>6</sup>. Here the mechanics of bringing together different social groups to engage in a process of political leadership for society as a whole may be awesomely complex.

Finally, at a deeper level a major criticism of the consociational model is that in societies which are in the process of transition from cultural cleavage to merely cultural diversity, the imposition of a consociational model may have the effect of entrenching group identities which might otherwise have been slowly obliterated by a process of cultural homogenisation.

What then does consociationalism offer for a country such as Afghanistan? First, it would make clear to a range of different groups within Afghan society that a new political order established through central instrumentalities of the state had something to offer them. Otherwise one might well find groups such as the Hazaras for whom the re-establishment of a significant central state could simply amount to a replication of patterns of prejudice by which they felt that they had been disadvantaged in the past. Second, a consociational system might well hold out the prospect of overcoming some of the specific problems which afflicted public administration in Afghanistan in the 1960s, namely, the informal tendency of Tajiks to dominate the state democracy and of Pushtuns to dominate the armed forces - an imbalance which proved extremely debilitating in the mid-to-late 1970s when non-elite Pushtuns who felt that they were unable to secure promotion on merit because of their non-elite status moved instead towards radical politics and the kind of destabilising seizure of power which took place in 1973.<sup>7</sup>

A new consociational system could not be expected to work if it excluded particular groups from entire institutions. On the other hand if it ensured a reasonable balance of representation of different groups, then it might prove stabilising in a way that the practices of the 1960s did not. The specific institutions that consociationalism would entail would be a matter to be determined by individual actors, with Islamic principles an obvious point of departure for those seeking to design specific institutions likely to resonate with a large part of the Afghan population.

Continued on p. 28



## Review

### Tin Mosques and Ghantowns

A History of Afghan  
Cameldrivers in Australia  
By: Christine Stevens

Oxford University Press 1989. P. 372

Book Review by Laila Saikal

*Tin Mosques and Ghantowns* by Christine Stevens is a comprehensive chronology of the history of early Muslims in Australia. It goes into much more detail than either May Schinasi's 1980 *Afghanistan Council paper*, or Michael Cigler's 1986 book *The Afghans in Australia*. The first wave of Muslims migration began in 1860 when three Afghans were enlisted to accompany the camels for the Bourke and Wills expedition. As the British colony was stretching further across inland Australia, camels and their Afghan handlers became instrumental in the development of services and cartage of necessities to isolated settlements in Australia's interior.


Stevens sheds light on the spiritual, physical and social hardships which these pioneering men endured. She provides a rare alternative to the usual Australian history books where the contribution of Afghans to the development of inland Australia is either underplayed or inaccurately portrayed. Strength is given to this fascinating book by the author's exhaustive research. Stevens has traced existing descendants of the original cameleers and utilized further information from local amateur historians together with newspaper clippings, letters and photography, giving authenticity to the book.

The cameleers often came to the Australian colony on a three year contract basis. They formed insular communities called Ghantowns which could be likened to ghettos. These settlements were isolated from the rest of the outback community. The Afghans were seen "barbaric, immoral, pagan and unclean" by most Europeans and aboriginals. Consequently, the early Australian marriages with Afghans began with aboriginal women and half-castes or European women living "marginal lives." The religious practices bound the Afghans into their tightly-knit Ghantown communities. The adherence to prayer and their wearing of long clothes with turbans, their



To page 28

LOOK NATIONAL PAPER is, according to its masthead (right), a semi-monthly newspaper now in its 3rd year. (Issue #35, 10 pages in length, appeared in July.) Produced at the Gov't Printing House, it costs Afs. 20 a copy. The licensed publisher is 'Abd-al-Basār 'Pākzād."



The paper promises "humor, satire, cartoons." Articles appear in both Dari & Pashto, prose & verse, & range from one-liners to lengthy stories. A few ads (more promised for the future), announcements, the inevitable movie star interview (Mina Kashi), & a page of lost licenses & ID numbers round out the issue.

"Look" is moderate in tone &, one may assume, hopes to win a circulation war against the opposition in filling the reading public's needs for satirical commentary on current Afghan affairs.

C.J. Brunner  
Hoboken, NJ

#### CONSOCIATIONALISM - Continued from p. 27

In conclusion, there are two points I should like to emphasise. First, there are great dangers in trying to link a consociational system with a presidential system, for presidential rule tends to place a member of one particular group in a privileged power vis-à-vis other groups, and this is rarely stabilising in a deeply divided society. My impression is that in Afghanistan there are a considerable number of individuals who fear a «political settlement» precisely because it might leave a particular individual from a particular group in a position of dominance. For this reason a consociational distribution of power might have much to commend it. This ties in with the final point that I should like to make. That is that there is little to be gained in hoping for the emergence of a «Great Leader». A «Great Leader» can all too easily turn into a 'Führer' who leads a society into barbarism of the kind which is the last thing that is needed in Afghanistan at the moment. What one needs is not a political structure which will allow a «Great Leader» to emerge, but rather one which will ensure that ordinary people rule wisely. It seems to me that in this respect there is much to be said for the consociational model.

2. A. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven 1977, p. 25. For a more detailed discussion of the consociational model in the Afghan context, see Amin Saikal and William Maley, *Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Politics of Legitimacy*. Boulder 1991, pp. 161-165.
3. See J. P. Entelis, «How Could Something So Right Go So Wrong?: The Collapse of Lebanon's Ethnoconfessional Democracy», in F. Kazemi and R.D. McChesney (eds.), *A Way Prepared: Essays in Islamic Culture in Honor of Richard Bayly Winder*. New York 1988, pp. 216-240.
4. Assertion canvassed in K. D. McRae, «Theories of Power-Sharing and Conflict Management», in J.V. Montville (ed.), *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*. Lexington 1990, pp. 93-106 at pp. 98-99.
5. B. Barry, *Democracy, Power and Justice: Essays in Political Theory*. Oxford 1990, p. 135.
6. D.L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley 1985, p. 574.
7. R.H. Magnus, «The Military and Politics in Afghanistan: Before and After the Revolution», in E.A. Olsen and S. Jurika, Jr. (eds.), *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies*. Boulder 1986, pp. 325-344 at p. 335.

Afghanistan Info no 30, September 1991



abstinence from alcohol and haram foods, the foreign language spoken and unusual sexual segregation were just some of the factors building barriers between the Afghans and non-Afghans. Photographs of the rugged Ghanatown dwellings, tin and mud mosques with thatched roofs with the nearby ablution pods, the graveyards. . . all draw the reader into this unique period of Australian history. Islam is clearly seen to be an integral part of these early Afghans' daily lives. Stevens has described the five pillars of Islam and how they were practised in the outback by these early founders of Islam in Australia. Rustic bush mosques sprang up wherever Afghans settled.

Fasting was adhered to strictly, even those who could not afford the time off work "continued to travel with camel strings across the burning outback." Islam was practised despite hardship and religious discrimination. One instance cited by Stevens was when Afghans were making wudu (ablution) in a pond and an outraged European shot and killed one of them for "washing their feet in drinking water."

Unfortunately, some of the aspects of the book pertaining to Islam are inaccurate, for instance Stevens has referred to the Afghans as "Muhammadans" rather than as Muslims. It has also been assumed, in some instances, that Afghan traditions and Islamic traditions are one and the same, when in fact this is not always the case.

AFGHANews

September 1, 1991.



## Prof speaks on reconstruction in Afghanistan

By Telly Baron  
Aggie Staff Writer

Although the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ended over two years ago, the Afghan people still face difficulties in rebuilding their country, according to a visiting economics professor who spoke at UC Davis on Thursday.

M. Siddiq Noorzo, a professor emeritus of economics from Stanford University, discussed "War, Peace and Reconstruction" in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion.

In 1979, the Soviet Union established a government in Kabul sympathetic to the line of the Communist Party. In Noorzo's view, the KGB's involvement in the invasion indicates that the U.S.S.R. "subverted the government of a sovereign state."

"The present conflict in Afghanistan has been going on for more than 13 years....The Afghan people have been fighting (both) to force the Soviet army out and to remove the remnants of the Communist regime," Noorzo said.

Following the invasion, the Soviet occupation army of over 100,000 men waged "pacification operations" against the Afghan resistance movement, he said.

Noorzo maintained that the struggle continues for the Afghan people.

"There are still Soviet advisers in Afghanistan....Soviet ambassadors (are still in power) and raids are still carried out," he said.

Noorzo also pointed to the widespread damage inflicted by the war. "The war years have been very costly to both the people and to the country."

According to Noorzo's research, population losses in Afghanistan totaled 1.7 million by 1978-79. Additionally, 5.5 million refugees have fled Afghanistan as a result of the fighting.

The war also crippled the Afghan infrastructure, Noorzo said, noting that schools, hospitals and roads were severely damaged.

"Forty percent of the arable land is now unproductive," he said, and consequently, export earnings from agriculture have dropped dramatically.

Noorzo said reconstruction is necessary and urged a solution through peaceful means.

The presentation was sponsored by the Afghan Student Association Network.

The California Aggie  
Univ. of California -  
Davis 11/18/91


Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Director of the Area Study Center at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan, joins the Institute faculty this year as Quaid-e-Azam Professor at Columbia University. In addition to teaching a graduate course on "Political and Social Development in Pakistan," Professor Rais is currently revising a manuscript completed last year on state and society in Afghanistan. Its tentative title is "State and Society Under the Khalq: 1978-1991."

NEWSLETTER of the Southern Asia Inst.,  
Columbia Univ. Fall 1991, Vol. 16, #1.

## Chopped Chicken

NAJIB POPAL SAW THE FUTURE of street food, and its name was chicken. A refrigerator salesman in Afghanistan, Popal had come to the U.S. and was selling beef koftas—small patties still offered by some vendors—when, in 1983, he sensed a red-meat scare on the horizon. His solution: marinated chicken thighs, grilled and chopped, served in a pita with lettuce, tomato, and any of four sauces. Messy? Of course. But toothsome, too, and only \$2.75. Popal was the first to sell such chicken, he claims, and is still the best. "It is because of the seasoning I use," he says, "but that's a

secret; I can't say. I'm very sorry." Popal's pushcart is part of the flotilla parked across from Radio City Music Hall, at Sixth Avenue and 50th Street.



NAJIB POPAL.

NEW YORK/DECEMBER 23-30, 1991

## Bringing In '92 With Grand Plans

Plans for world peace, or just to lose weight, in 1992.

Many who had ducked into Mickey Mantle's to escape the chill and glaring sunlight of the streets talked of wanting to lose weight or quit smoking. But not Mohammad Kamel Jalal-lar, a 30-year-old artist from Afghanistan, who sat at the bar, sipping beer while listening to Turkish folk songs on a Walkman with four packs of cigarettes — Newport, Marlboros, Parliament and Dorals — piled in front of him. "Quit smoking? Never," he said. "I like to smoke many brands." He had no New Year's resolutions, but happily predicted world peace for 1992.

## King's men busted at Kabul rally

Dozens of armed men broke up a rally of the supporters of the former king in Kabul, forcing them to abandon a planned march near the presidential palace and on to the Soviet Embassy.

About 200 counter-demonstrators forced the 150 pro-king demonstrators to end their meeting one hour after it had started.

The rally was organized by Zia Khan Nassery, a Harvard-trained US citizen.

"Down with the regime... dissolve the KHAAD (Afghan secret police)" were some of the large banners

that Nassery had erected in a central Kabul park.

The internal security ministry had given permission to Nassery to hold the rally, in line with the government's recent reformist policies.

A regime official disclaimed any responsibility for disrupting the rally, saying "Whatever happened during the rally was not the government's fault. It was between the civilians."

Zia Khan is a strange man. He appeared in Pakistan in 1979, claiming to run a news agency from a luxurious hotel in Islamabad. He visited Kunar Province, where he was photographed operating an anti-aircraft gun. Some Pakistani papers described him as a Mujahideen leader.

He went to Iran but was expelled. American embassy documents, published by Iranian students who occupied the embassy from late 1979 to early 1981, revealed that Nassery had

been trying to pose as a leader of the Afghan resistance in order to muster support. Many people suspected him to be an agent of Western secret agencies.

In the mid-80s, he started to publish a paper in America by the name of "Afghan News." In his paper, he ridiculed the Mujahideen parties and supported the former king. He also was among those Afghans living in exile who were trying to form a government in exile. At one stage, they were planning a peace march to Kabul, despite the presence of Soviet troops in the country. He has now surfaced in Kabul, and despite being a citizen of the United States of America, has been given permission to promote the return of the King. Nassery told AFP he was returning to the US because there is no possibility of political work in Kabul as long as Najib is in power.

AFGHANews

December 1, 1991

# ORGANIZATIONS

## Support for Afghan Further Education

(SAFE) is an NGO based in Peshawar which aims to increase the number of educated & skilled refugees who will play a central role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Begun in 1990, the SAFE program has been administered by the Salvation Army in Pakistan, but at the end of 1991 SAFE was taken over by the Afghan Development Assn, a new Afghan NGO formed with the help of the Salvation Army. In 1990, SAFE assisted 8 Afghan students studying medicine & agriculture in Pakistani colleges; in 1991, 11 students benefitted from the program. For further information, write Afghan Refugee Information Network (ARIN), 18 Burstock Road, London SW 15 2 PW, UK.

Another British NGO, Afghanaid, 292 Pentonville Road, London N1 9NR reported on its fruit tree project:

FOLLOWING the success of last year's pilot fruit tree sapling distribution project in the Panjshir valley, Afghanaid has doubled the number of saplings planted. Four thousand nine hundred and eighty six saplings were distributed in 1990 (see Newsletter no 8); this year a further 11,390 apple, peach and apricot saplings were planted by 973 farmers.

Housing remains the principal concern of many farmers in the Panjshir valley: traditional building materials, in particular poplar wood beams, are in short supply because many were destroyed in aerial bombing or died when irrigation channels were destroyed or abandoned as people left the valley as refugees. Of those trees remaining, many were cut down and used as firewood. Forty thousand poplar tree cuttings were distributed to Panjshiri farmers by Afghanaid during 1991 as a first step to replacing these trees and providing for future housing needs.

## Aid bans

EARLY in September the Government of Pakistan announced that no expatriate aid personnel other than UN staff would be granted permits to cross into Afghanistan for an indefinite period. The measure seems to stem from a desire by the government to prevent a repetition of incidents such as the kidnapping

of two American aid workers in Zabal province in July. The ban is causing serious difficulties to the aid agencies that operate cross-border from Peshawar. In Afghanaid's case it has meant that Project Officers have been prevented from visiting project sites at a crucial time in the agricultural calendar: if wheat seed is not delivered and distributed to farmers before the onset of winter, no planting will take place this year. The benefits of the projects will therefore be delayed for 12 months. At the same time, evaluation of current projects will not be carried out, so necessary adjustments and improvements in project design will not be made. The effects of the ban therefore will last well into next year.

Efforts with other aid agencies to persuade the Pakistan government to lift the ban continue but have so far not met with any success.

In an unrelated move the Shura-e-Nazar, the mujahideen supervisory council in north-eastern Afghanistan, issued a one-month ban beginning in September on the use of donkeys and horses carrying inputs by NGOs on the Chitral route into Afghanistan. Although the ban was applied rigorously, some essential supplies have been delivered: Afghanaid managed to transport more than 20 tonnes of seed and fertiliser over the passes in the first weeks of October. A consignment of gabion wire for use in river-defence work has however been significantly delayed.

It is not clear yet whether the ban was indeed lifted at the end of Sep-

Aziz Herawi, an eminent rebab & dutar player, will present a series of concerts, joined by tabla master Asif Mahmood & musicologist John Baily. Also planned are film showings, workshops & educational programs for schools. Exhibitions will include photographs, Afghan artifacts & embroidery by Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

For further information, contact Anne Hunt, World Circuit Arts, 35a Station Crescent, London N15 5BG. Tel: 081-809-7960; Fax: 081-809-5586.

The Language Laboratory at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) offers broadcasts of news programs received via satellite from


around the world - including Afghanistan.

tember, but even if it was, donkeys and horses remain in very short supply.

Fortunately the hiring ban applies only to the northern route into Afghanistan. Considerable amounts of seed and fertiliser were delivered by Afghanaid into the eastern province of Wardak in September using the southern passes.

**NEWSLETTER**

no 10 Autumn 1991



## AFGHAN COMMUNITY CULTURAL PROJECT

World Circuit Arts will present, in cooperation with Afghan associations in London, an Afghan Arts Festival from March 21-April 12, 1992. The Festival will open with a Nawroz party on 3/21 at Acton Town Hall. Most of the Festival events will take place in Hounslow & Ealing because of the large Afghan populations there.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Volume 3 of CHRONIQUE D'UN TEMOIN PRIVILEGIE, Lettres d'Afghanistan de Serge de Beaurecueil was published by CEREDAF, 12 rue de Cotte, 75012 Paris, at the end of December. This is the final volume in the series and covers the period from 1981-83. 224 pp.; 126 Ff.

L'ASIE DU SUD-OUEST: AFGHANISTAN, IRAN & PAKISTAN by Firouzeh Nahawandu, L'Harmattan, 1991. 190 pp.; 110 Ff.

"Wird Afghanistan zum Libanon Zentralasiens? by Monika Scherrer in ZEITBILD, 23/91, November. Pp.10-11.

BETWEEN TWO GIANTS: POLITICAL HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE 19th CENTURY by Sayed Qassem Reshtia, Afghan Jihad Works Translation Centre, Peshawar, 1990. 443 pp., photos, maps.

PAST & PRESENT TRADITIONAL ASSEMBLIES IN AFGHANISTAN (in Pashtu) by Abdul Jalil Wajdi, Peshawar, 1986. 298 pp.

SILENT SOLDIER: THE MAN BEHIND THE AFGHAN JEHAD, GEN. AKHTAR ABDUR RAHMAN SHAHEED by Moh'd Yousuf, Jang, Lahore, 1991. 106 pp., map & photos. (Also published in Urdu.)

EDUCATION IN THE FUTURE SOCIETY OF AFGHANISTAN, report (in Dari) of the 3rd seminar on the Future of Islamic Afghanistan, Cultural Council of Afghanistan Resistance, Islamabad, 1991. 470 pp.

POWER STRUGGLE IN THE HINDU KUSH: AFGHANISTAN (1978-1991) by Kamal Matinuddin, Wajidalis, Lahore, 1991. ix + 377 pp.; maps, photos.

MAKING THE MOVE - Repatriation of Afghan Refugees & FRONTIER ODYSSEY - Up the Khyber by Carol Rose for the INSTITUTE OF CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS (the Crane-Rogers Foundation), Hanover, New Hampshire. June & July, 1991.

RHETORIC & POLITICS IN AFGHAN TRADITIONAL STORYTELLING by Margaret Ann Mills, Philadelphia, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. a publication of the

American Folklore Society, 1991. Also by Margaret Mills:

Oral narrative in Afghanistan: the individual in tradition / Margaret A. Mills. — New York; London: Garland, 1990. — 484p: ill, 1 map; 24cm. — (Harvard dissertations in folklore and oral tradition)  
Bibliography: p473-484  
ISBN 0-8240-2871-6: No price  
1.Ti 2.Sr. Harvard dissertations in folklore and oral tradition 3.Folk literature 4. Afghanistan  
B91-18624

AFGHANISTAN: THE SYNAGOGUE & THE JEWISH HOME, edited by Zohar Hanegbi & Bracha Yaniv. Part of the Survey of Synagogues & their Treasures, Jerusalem Index of Jewish Art, Center for Jewish Art, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1991. 220 pp., illus. \$100. Available from Ita Aber, 1 Fanshaw Avenue, Yonkers, NY 10705. (914) 968-4863.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF AFGHANISTAN by Ludwig W. Adamec, #5 in a new series of Asian Historical Dictionaries:

392 pp. map 1991 91-31544 ISBN 0-8108-2491-4 \$39.50

SCARECROW PRESS, INC.

P.O. Box 4167, Metuchen, NJ 08840

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This is a concise reference source listing important events and personalities, geographical, cultural, and political data, and a wealth of information of interest to the general reader as well as to the serious student of Afghanistan.

The work is divided into five parts: introduction to Afghan history, dictionary, chronology, selected bibliography, and an appendix with genealogies of major tribes and ethnic groups and important families.

Copies of AFGHANISTAN 1989 IN SOCIOLINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE by Jadwiga Pstrusinska, a study focusing on state power & Afghanistan's ethnic minorities, is available from the Society for Central Asian Studies, 6 Elm Bank Gardens, London SW13 0NT, UK, for \$5.

AFGHAN JOKES & PROVERBS, compiled by Dr. Moh'd Aziz Seraj, Vantage Press, 516 West 34th St., New York, NY, 10001, 1991. ISBN: 0-533-08895-X. 37 pp.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

AFGHANISTAN: AN ATLAS OF INDIGENOUS DOMESTIC ARCHITECTURE, Albert Szabo & Thomas J. Barfield, Foreward by Eduard F. Sekler, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1991. xxiv + 264 pp., illus, biblio, index. ISBN 0-292-70419-4. \$80.

The interest in the anonymous architecture of America, which ranged from Pennsylvania barns to mid-west gasoline stations, coincided with the arrival of American architects in regions where anonymous architecture was the rule rather than the exception. The rural buildings of preindustrial societies, formerly of interest only to anthropologists, began to be recognized as successful design, structural and environmental solutions to particular problems. This interest developed at the time when many of the world's traditional building styles were disappearing as the resources they required became scarcer and "modern" technology became more available.


The domestic styles of Afghan architecture treated in this volume may soon undergo the changes that have occurred elsewhere in the developing world as hardships increase and "foreign ideas" penetrate isolated regions. For that reason alone the research which this volume documents is important as a permanent historical record of styles that may vanish as the juggernaut of international architecture makes its inevitable advance. The uniform design concepts and industrial materials "modernization" entails could wipe out the architectural variety in the countryside as it has already done in many cities around the world. When local architectural heritage has been preserved deliberately, it is often spotty and artificial.

In this volume the architectural examples follow an introduction which treats briefly the environmental, historical and demographic characteristics of the Afghan nation. This written summary is supplemented by a series of 12 general reference maps noting diagrammatically the geographic, climatic and ethnic areas in which the buildings occur. Each building type is located as to the region in which it occurs as is the site of the sample chosen.

The authors make a major division between "non-sedentary" and "sedentary" dwellings. To their credit more pages are devoted to the tents, yurts and huts of nomads and semi-nomads than to the more photogenic and more often studied permanent housing of picturesque agricultural settlements. The temporary and portable nature of the nomad buildings has meant that they are often neglected



Village of flat-roof construction with massive stone walls in the Salang Mountains near Taqma.



in agricultural studies.

The examples of sedentary dwellings range from the cave dwellings still existing in Bamiyan to the complicated multistoried mountainside settlements of Nuristan. Throughout the book, written analysis of a domestic building form is supplemented with photographs and detailed construction diagrams, showing the process by which the buildings are erected. They range from simple reed huts to composite construction systems using wood, stone, brick and mud.

Part three of the volume, "Buildings in Context," is based on research conducted by Prof. Szabo and his students from Kabul University in the mid 1970s. Four villages employing differing architectural styles were investigated and documented in photographs and drawings. The analysis included the cultural context as it affected, or was affected by, the physical relationship of the buildings to each other and the uses of the spaces within the buildings.


Although the actual construction system of building erection is well documented, the process by which the building materials themselves are manufactured, modified or gathered is treated more lightly. Not described are the tools and techniques for weaving or felting the cloth materials, nor the preparation of mud, stone or timber. These activities are actually an integral part of the complete construction process otherwise so well documented. Much of this work, along with the continual maintenance that many structures require, is accomplished by the family members themselves, or is the result of a long and demanding apprenticeship for skilled workers. This educational and resource-bound chain once broken may be impossible to restore in the countryside.

With their examples, the authors illustrate the economic, material and cultural determinants that have created the styles. Changes in any of these factors will lead necessarily to changes in style and may make it difficult to maintain those buildings which still exist.

This volume and an earlier work, *TRADITIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF AFGHANISTAN* by Hallet and Samizay, 1980, together produce a record of traditional buildings that few developing countries have available. This handsome, well-illustrated volume stands as a tribute to the builders who produced the architecture it illustrates. It is a valuable textbook on the appropriate use of indigenous materials for architects, both Afghan and foreign.

Daniel C. Dunham  
New York, NY

### Dome construction



# THE KABUL TIMES

## Population problem and Rehabilitation of Afghanistan

It is an interesting subject that the issue of population be analyzed and studied briefly in Afghanistan, considering the global problem which arises from rapid population growth rate. The thirteen year long war in Afghanistan has left multi-sided and differently effected the normal growth rate of population and has affected proportionately population distribution. During the war years, substantial variation and serious demographic differentials have emerged in the population pyramid, illustrated on the basis of the data collected in the first Afghan population, conducted in 1979. Due to enormous flow of migration and population displacement, especially among the active population, ranging between age 15-40 years, a deep slope can be observed in the population pyramid, depicting a different shape in comparison with other developing countries. Likewise, fertility trend has been seriously affected and mortality and material mortality as well as infant mortality rate have most likely, increased due to unfavourable social, environmental and prevailing economic situation in this country.

Large migration flow and migration stream to foreign countries, continuation of mass migration, during the war years from war-stricken regions to the city centres, separation of centres from the remote rural areas, destruction of economic structures such as irrigation networks, electrical facilities, constructions, and disruption of the over all public services, destruction of relatively developed residential areas, disruption of population normal settlement and, ultimately, all-

round socio-economic political, military crisis have been jointly operating to affect basically the political, military crisis and population growth pattern.

Likewise, considerable problems have consequently emerged which makes heavier the responsibility of the future responsible authorities in this country than any other time.

The growth rate of population has been accurately estimated at the nation-wide level in this country for the last ten years. In 1979, the total population of Afghanistan was estimated at 14,551 million with the annual growth rate of 2.9 per cent. It is just an estimated figure because the first Afghan population of 1979 was not a complete census and most of the areas were not counted due to environmental and newly emerging political disturbances. Concisely speaking, statistical coverage was incomplete in the first population census and just an intelligent guess determined the total population on the basis of the first adhoc survey conducted to test the prelists and questionnaires in the field. An estimation of the UN recorded the annual population growth rate at 3 percent in Afghanistan. The international news agency report of high infant and material mortality rates among the Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries. Mortality rate is also high among those who are living in the areas outside the umbrella of the central government and the areas under dominant control of opposition forces and among those who stay in remote areas and do not receive in time the necessary aids. This pro-

blem has increased due to continuation of war, drought years, mass migration flow in certain parts of Afghanistan.

According to available figures over 1.5 million people have been killed during the war years and another 1.5 million have become handicapped and disabled.

Moreover, over five million Afghans are living in foreign countries, of whom only 2 per cent are staying in European countries, under relatively normal and better conditions. While the condition of living is terrible in the camps of refugees in Pakistan and in Iran. Mothers and children do not receive any assistance. According to reports most of the children and their mothers are abducted there.

Furthermore, the war has had many other negative impacts on the population growth rate both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The economically active population or labour forces of the country, estimated at 4 million persons, were mainly pushed to war and they were badly affected as a result of the war negative impacts.

Likewise, the labour force, ranging between age groups 18-40 years were forced from the two conflicting sides to participate in war, as a result of which the greatest death toll were inflicted on the young generation in this country.

Brain drain went up massively as a consequence of the on-going devastating war particularly, the educated, experts, intellectuals, artists, scholars, university lecturers and craftsmen were forced to leave the country.

The normal process of educational attainment both at professional and vocational institutions and higher educational institutions have been seriously disturbed.



**Workers have great role in boosting up the national economy in the country.**

This matter can be too serious in case of those refugees who are passing and wandering aimlessly in foreign countries. It is the Islamic and national responsibility of every Afghan, particularly those who can play a major role in the process of settling the existing entanglement, to show mercy to the innocent people of Afghanistan and to find a logical way, irrespective of their personal and clan interests, for achieving peace and stability in this country. We should not forget that rehabilitation and reconstruction of this country need a lot of time and reaching that opportunity should not be precluded at all under any pretext. 12/12/91

**concluded)**  
**(By F. M. Sami)**



## KAM company started producing soft-drinks after a pause of three years

The KAM company of Afghanistan producing soft-drinks, commenced production after a pause of three years, expending a sum of US \$2 million for rehabilitation and renewal of its machineries.

Producing five types of soft-drinks—Coca Cola, Fanta, Sprite, Tonic and Soda Water, the complex has general laboratories, steam, syrup production and other relevant section. It produces 150 bottles per minute.

Temour Shah Surkhabi, deputy-head of the company told our reporter that the company intends to increase production to a level of 120,000 bottles per day so that it can meet partial requirements of the citizens. The company employs 100 workers who work in two shifts.

The KAM has eleven

distribution outlets in different parts of the city and uses 40 vehicles daily to transport its products to the outlets. The company's products are mainly distributed to the Kabul city and partially to some provinces.

The company procures its raw materials and bottles from India, Pakistan, Germany, the Soviet Union and Belgium, bottles from India, Pakistan materials are procured locally.

The company, at the moment is faced with the problem of skilled technicians and workers to carry out the technical affairs and keep the machines active. Currently, three Indian specialists are helping the company in training Afghan cad-

res.

An Indian specialist told our reporter that the Afghans are bestowed with special abilities and talents, adding that they have learned a lot how to use new machines and within two or more weeks there will be no need for their existence here, as the Afghan workers now are fully familiar with their equipments.

Dr. Mumby Welson, president of the Bangkok Coca Cola company is also in Kabul. Commenting on commencement of production of KAM company of Afghanistan, he said that Coca Cola has been produced for 105 years and the syrup is now produced in 65 countries throughout the

world. However, the Coca Cola produced in Afghanistan, has a special taste and is of first grade, he pointed out. Because the KAM Company of Afghanistan once got the first place among the companies producing the syrup. The Company also received numerous medals and awards from the central office of Coca Cola corporation.

The main reason that your Coca Cola is recognised as the best one is the tasty and sweet water of your country. I wish the KAM company of Afghanistan further successes to gain further support of the Afghan people, he pointed out.

A source of the company said that all the expenses of the comp-

any is provided by the family of Majid Zabuli, an Afghan national capital holder who is the owner of the company. The state has 25 percent share and assists it in provision of power, oil and sugar.

Commencement of production by the KAM company was not helpful in employment of a number of workers and distributors but would hopefully strengthen the national economy as well.

The production of the company is sold at Af. 65 per bottle which is quite cheaper than foreign companies rate.

Established in 1971 with the initial capital of Af. 81 million, the company has a capital of Af. 3 billion; now and is located in Darul-Aman area, Kabul.

(Naftsa Khushnab)

11/30

## Soviet POWs fight on Mujahiddin side

MOSCOW.

Some Soviet prisoners of war in Afghanistan are voluntarily fighting today on the Mujahiddin's side, Valeri Sidorov, a senior official of the Soviet scientific-industrial council, told a press conference in Moscow Friday, TASS reports.

Claims that there are some 300 POWs kept by the Afghan opposition are a bit exaggerated, said Sidorov, who has just returned from Kabul. He offered money to Mujahiddin to secure the release of one soldier, but to no avail.

He said there are about 30-40 real POWs left, others have settled down in Pakistan, have now their own families there and have accepted Islam. It is unbelievable, Sidorov added.

Some 220-250 soldiers are considered to be lost in action, which implies most of them are dead, Sidorov said.

The list of those missing and POWs should be thoroughly checked once

more. The Afghans promised to help, he added.

The envoy has killed the hope of many Soviet mothers who thought the recent talks with Mujahiddin in Moscow would have helped to secure their sons' release from captivity. Negotiations will be long and difficult, Sidorov thinks.

The Mujahiddin, should not have pledged in Moscow to help return Soviet POWs since most of them are kept by field commanders in Afghanistan, who know that POWs are a valuable commodity, according to the official. It was the Afghan president who ordered to buy out 7 Soviet soldiers, he disclosed, adding that it was a costly deal.

Hundreds of thousands of dollars are needed to create a special fund to pay for the release of Soviet POWs, Russian Aushiev, president of Afghan veterans committee, told the press conference. Only the Soviet president will have the right to use the money, he added.

NOVEMBER 24, 1991



The KAM Company producing beverages.

## RA pays keen attention to teenagers

President. Najibullah has issued the following order on creation of a national commission to support and take care of teenagers in the country.

Taking into account the values embodied in articles 15 and 19 of the Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan as regards healthy growth, insurance of their health, training and education, of teenagers, especially those with no guardians as a result of the war, for prevention of deviation and crimes of teenagers, adoption of measures for specifying settlement localities for the guardianless teenagers particularly those who resort to violations, the following are approved:

### Article One:

In order to support and take care of teenagers, a national commission is formed under the chairmanship of Abdul Karim Shahdan, Chief Justice of the Republic of Afghanistan.

### Article Two:

The commission is assigned to:

1— Prepare a national programme for rendering support to and take care of the teenagers and present the same to the Presidential Office for subsequent accomplishment.

2— Pave the ground for attraction of cooperation of international agencies especially UNESCO, UNICEF, ICRC and other world organisations and interested countries for

realisation of the national programme for rendering support to and take care of teenagers.

3— Prepare detailed data on the guardianless teenagers and guide the relevant organs for creation of training and care centres for education of teenagers with the cooperation of other state institutions.

4— Adopt appropriate measures with the assistance of other relevant organs for insurance of the health of children and mothers affected as a result, of the war.

5— Draw the attention of the related organs to insurance of required living condition, education upgrading their talents and employment of teenagers.

6— Evaluate the reasons and factors leading the teenagers to malpractices through its sub-commissions and seek effective ways to prevent the same.

### Article Three:

The Council of Ministers and other related

organs are duty-bound to cooperate in realisation of the measures adopted by the national commission and provide the ground for implementation thereof in their respective sphere.

### Article Four:

1— For ensuring better order and cooperation, the commission shall form sub-committees and a secretariate office.

2— For bringing about harmonisation of activi-

ties and cooperation among the related organs, the commission is assigned to prepare a regulation.

Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan. NOVEMBER 21, 1991

## 'Soldier Trophy' contests begin

The football contests of the "Soldier Trophy" was launched by the education department of the armed forces under the supervision of the football federation in the national sport stadium yesterday.

A concerned source reported that in the A-group, the football teams of army sport club, Hedayat, Etyad, Habbayana and Pamir and in the B-group the football teams of Maiwand, Kargar, Lalaha, Araya and Teardandy sport club will meet in the first round of the competitions in the Kabul sport stadium every day.

In yesterday's matches, Pamir team defeated Etyad team 2-0.

The football teams of Kargar, Teardandy Lalaha and Ariva will meet today. (BIA)

## Worst peace preferable over best war

The endeavours by the opposition seem to have come to a standstill, as they have failed to have their position and their line with the vastly changed international scenario which predominantly urges the hostile forces and antagonists' repudiation. How the Mujahiddin delegation behaved in their talks with the Soviet authorities clearly indicates that efforts are under way in line with the policies which have no customer, in the market of politics any more, say, their ambition for ascending to power in a monopolistic fashion and through neglecting the other political forces. The utterances by Burhanuddin Rabani in meetings with the Soviet diplomats brought to light that the meeting was intended not for searching new ways of accelerating the peace process in Afghanistan, but was based on a selfish thinking.

Further, it seems disapplicable how have Burhanuddin Rabani and his companions authorized themselves to pressurise,

as they put it, Moscow to withdraw its support from the State of the Republic of Afghanistan and shift to the Mujahiddin. It remained unclear whether Burhanuddin Rabani had come to Moscow representing an established and legitimate political system or a few Tanzims that are paying not the least heed to Rabani himself and to what he has agreed upon. Ignorant seemed the delegation that they were not sent by the people and the political forces, nor their decisions could be acceptable for them. On the other hand, if those opposed to the Najibullah-led state had enough political wisdom and ability, they should have not overflown their own country's territory to discuss the issues of their own home with outsiders, as in the post-reconciliation period and following the Soviet troop pull-out, Kabul vividly demonstrated its readiness always to sit for political dialogue with its political rivals. With its policy of national reconciliation, Fr-

esident Najibullah has embarked on such a path which has rendered his opponents choiceless, expect the option to peace, as their, any other attempt will prove militarism and hostilities who have no supporter longer. One should not try to conceal the realities: As much as the defenders of the present regime have got sick of the continuing conflict, the militants of the other side are equally tired too and have no eagerness to be the cannon fodder for an aimless battle. This can't be attested to by the increasing come-over of hundreds of the opponents to the side of 'peace' and the people.

On the other hand, some of the opponents are claiming that they would persist on the war unless President Najibullah has relinquished his position. However, they have failed to make it precise what they mean by the term of relinquish.

As far as the Afghanistan-related developmen-

ts and processes permit, Kabul is understood to have offered even new forms of approach in some cases. The Watan Party has now ceased to be the ruling force in the society; it is next to the coalition of other political forces. The National Assembly has been reactivated after a pause of 15 years with full authority and freedom. Political parties and organisation, with different and conflicting ways of thinking have opened their offices in Kabul and have their own free publications. The 'list will swiftly run longer if we began counting the achievements of the post-reconciliation period.

Anyway, those faction of the opposition forces who are awaiting acts of relinquish on the part of the Dr. Najibullah's state, are expected to set forth their views and opinions in a way their desire. However it would an exercise in futility and a means of publicity for the press if these views are the repetition and the product of their past policies which were directed at monopolism, egoism and negation of this or that force.

Neither the State nor its opposition forces are

in a position not let the time go awaste, as a month or more has remained to enforcement of the Soviet-US agreement, which, does mean the practical cessation of war, but it is a step for flattening the grounds for peace, the people of Afghanistan cherish. It is needless to say that the dumps of arms of both the sides can sufficiently feed the war for longer periods. However, why this reality has been forgotten that who is killed and what a goal this bloodshed can meet. Why this view, "the worst peace is preferable over to best war" is not turned to.

11/20 (N. M. Atanai)

# Ceremony for New born baby

When a child is born he or she is washed, dressed and wrapped with a white cloth and tied with a strip around his/her shoulders up to his/her ankles. Afterwards the midwife puts a piece of Burboo (a kind of dried plant) on the fire, (to keep the baby safe from the Devil's harm).

If the new baby is a boy, the mid-wife will say "thanks God, the child is a boy!"

On the third day, the parents have to name the new born baby, so the close relatives are invited to the parents' home of the newly-born baby, for a tea party, or a feast. Many names are recited so that one of the names be accepted by the parents. Then the father of the baby brings his son in the presence of the guests, and the Mullah prays and whispers his name in the presence of the guests. The bread will be distributed to all the neighbours' houses.

The Mullah also takes some money with a plate of Nokol (white round local sweet, covering seeds of apricots, peas or almond) with a handkerchief on it. This ceremony is held on the occasion of the sixth night of the new born baby. Locally we call it Shah-i-Shah.

One or two days before the party, the most close young girls gather in the house of the new born baby. The girls put on their new dresses and wear Chadaris (veils) and take some Nokol in a handkerchief in their hands.

They keep the list of the guests in the mind. The girls knock on each door. When the owners come out one of the girls hands him or her some Nokol and says, "Tomorrow you are invited in our house."

Usually this ceremony takes place at night and continues till morning. But nowadays, it is held during the day for environmental problems. The

young girls play music and dances in turn. Then a woman appears with a tray on her head. In the tray she puts sweets and the new clothes for the baby, covered with a green or red piece of thin cloth.

The woman continues dancing and each guest hands her some money and the woman puts the money on the tray and says: "give 100 Afis." For instance, the guests reply "congratulations". In this manner all the guests offer some money which is received the same as they received.

## Hamam-e-Dah (Bath of tenth days)

This means the tenth day bath of the new born baby's mother.

On the occasion of the baby's birth, the parents hold another ceremony which is called Hamam Dah. In the morning of the 10th day, mid-wife takes the mother of the baby to the bathroom.

She spends about three hours in the bathroom (Hamam) to take a bath, then the mother of the baby gives more money than usual to Hamami, and the mid wife puts (mustard seeds) in the fire and they believe the mustard seeds keeps clean and safe the human body. At noon the midwife takes the baby's mother home.

Usually Hamam Dah (bathing on tenth day of birth) is a lunch party. There will be music and dancing up to the afternoon. At this party also the relatives give money as gifts to the baby's mother.

**Chahela Gurez :**  
(Invitation after the 40th day of the new born baby).

On the fortieth day of the new birth, the child's mother cooks some sweet round breads. She cut the centre of the big one and passes the baby three times through it. Then

the bread will be distributed among the neighbours.

On the same day, the mother takes the baby to a holy place where she can find a big tree with its root out of the ground and so she passes the baby under the root of the tree. Then the mother of the child returns home, after having her bath, the mid-wife makes a long seven coloured silk strip, as long as the mother's height. The silk strip has forty ties, and she starts to cut each tie with scissors and says:

"I cut your chehel..." until the last ties of the strip.

Afterwards the mid-wife takes some money and leaves the house.

Then the mother with a baby will be invited to her relatives' houses which is called Chahela Gurez, and while leaving them she will receive gifts from her parents and relatives.

11/30

## Majidi RPF offers best quality raisin to foreign markets



Mohammad Najib Majidi

ation on work and activities of the factory, the KT reporter interviewed with Mohammad Najib Majidi: head of the factory which is presented here below:

The factory processed and exported 2000 tons raisin according to international standard to foreign countries last year, in current year the factory has plan to process raisin 500 tons more than last year.

He added the best dealers of Afghan raisin are barter and free markets. Majidi Factory has agencies in the country and in London, USSR, Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The factory import ghee, powder milk, clothes matches, soap and equipments against export of raisin.

The Factory obtain raisin from Farwan, Kandahar, Ghazni and Logar, the raisin which we obtain from the above provinces have the best quality, the raisin of our country is the best compared to all countries in the world. The reason could be the fine weather and good climate of our

country.

He further added they desire to export a large quantity of raisin to foreign countries and to attract the attention of foreign countries. We wish to have commercial relation with other countries as well, the factory is member of "Industry Association" and has re-

ndered its responsibility.

One of the main thing for packing of raisin is having of equipments the factory could tackle this problem by cooperation of two Carton Making and Plastic Making Factories, because carton and plastic are the necessary things for packing processed raisin.

Carton Making Factory was established in the year 1364 HS with an investment of Afis. 20,787,000 and started functioning in 1365 HS. At present 50 workers are on payroll. The production capacity of this factory is 2500 pieces cartons daily. The factory import raw material from abroad.

Besides its need the factory can supply carton and plastic to other factories.

At present 150 workers are working in Raisin Processing Factory, he concluded.

(By Najla Masheed)



Workers of Majidi Raisin Processing Factory.

12/3

Majidi Raisin Processing Factory (RPF) located in Kabul Industrial Parks, established in 1360 HS at initial capital of Afis. 20 million and final capital of Afis. 54 million.

The factory could raise the capacity of the process of the raisin 5 tons per hour, in this case the income of the factory reached 20000 US dollar in 1370 HS.

To further get inform-


# CHRONOLOGY

10/30 - Omaha World-Herald - The US stopped all military aid to the Afghan guerrillas as of 10/15, even though the US-Soviet cut-off pact does not go into effect until 1/1/92.

11/5 - PT - Najibullah called for a cease fire. He said, "We have already ceased fire unilaterally, but it seems that the opposition cannot hear us."

- NYT - Ex-King Zahir Shah was stabbed by an assailant posing as a journalist. He was wounded, but not seriously, in the hand, mouth & stomach. The assailant, carrying a passport in the name of Jose de Almeida Santo Paulo, opened a package supposedly containing a gift. He drew a paper knife from it & lunged at Zahir Shah three times before aides called in Italian bodyguards. No motive was reported. [The 11/12 PT reported that the ex-king was released from the hospital after being treated.]

11/11 - LAT - Burhanuddin Rabbani led a delegation of mujahideen to Moscow to discuss ending the war in Afghanistan. (See articles on pps. 12,16.)



11/15 - AFGHANews (Jamiat) - Electric power transmission from the USSR to Kunduz & Mazar was suspended after the coup in Moscow. Authorities in Uzbekistan & Tajikistan have told Kabul to negotiate a new deal with them if they want to keep buying power.

11/18 - NYT - Najibullah called for wide-ranging peace talks in response to the joint statement issued by Moscow & Rabbani (see p.13) which called for an undefined Islamic gov't in Afghanistan. An ROA spokesman said the war would continue if an Islamic gov't excluded Najibullah & the Watan Party.

11/19 - KT - A new money & banking law to facilitate economic expansion in Afghanistan was approved by Da Afghanistan Bank.

11/20 - KT - Sayaf & Gulbuddin denounced the Moscow-Rabbani statement as a new conspiracy against the mujahideen.

- PT - The OIC announced Monday that it was willing to cooperate with the UN in facilitating the transfer of power in Afghanistan.

11/21 - KT - Najibullah appointed a new commission to handle teenagers (see p.35).

11/22 - PT - Pakistan called reports of its involvement in the diversion of arms to Iran (see p.14) blatant, false, fabrications made by Israeli intelligence.

11/25 - PT - The Soviet Union has speeded up the withdrawal of some 300 combat experts from Afghanistan.

- ACBAR News Summary #4 - Pakistan's ban on non-UN foreigners entering Afghanistan from Pakistan continues.

11/26 - PT - Iran asked the UN to supervise the unexpected influx of a large number of Afghan refugees into Iran.

11/28 - KT - Gulbuddin announced that he would not free the Soviet POWs he holds & asked other groups to follow suit.

- Far Eastern Economic Review - The Soviets agreed to end all weapons deliveries to Kabul before the new year, as well as fuel deliveries for military purposes. Moscow may send negotiators to Peshawar to talk to Gulbuddin since Moscow's chief aim is the release of Soviet POWs & Gulbuddin holds most of them.

12/1 - PT - Rabbani rejected rumors that Iran had secretly arranged with Kabul to drop supplies into the Bamiyan area. The Iranians said the drop was at the request of mujahideen commanders in the area (see article on p.6).

12/2 - KT - The Watan Party, in an effort to decrease its influence on the state press, will turn the daily Payam, the Party organ, into a weekly journal. The monthly Watan magazine will become a quarterly journal. Regarding the Weekly News:

The party created independent publications which could promote transition from unilateral monopoly of the Watan Party over the mass media towards a free press and freedom of speech and this way started publication of the "Akhbari-Hafta" (weekly news)... The expenses of the publication totalling Afs. 100 million per year was financed by the Watan Party.

However, under conditions that understanding and dialogue among the Afghans got augmented, the Watan Party decided that the weekly-news has achieved its tasks and continuation of its publication with its present attachment should be stopped.

The Watan Party in the meantime expressed its readiness to hand over the publication privilege of the weekly to any

official or private source interested and this way took another bold step towards removal of monopoly of the Watan Party in the publicity sphere to the interest of further deepening of democracy in the country.

The publicity and extension department of the Watan Party Central Council which persistently guided the editorial board of the weekly news, attributes the achievements of the same to a group of party journalists. However, it considers incorrect the irresponsible assertions of some members of the editorial board who by trying to gain reputation for themselves misused the freedom of the journal and humbleness of some other members of the editorial board, portraying himself the editor-in-chief of the weekly. (BIA)

12/4 - KT - Construction began on a project in Qalacha, south of Kabul, for the disabled. The Afs. 2b complex will have a 200-bed hospital, a clinic & a prosthesis-making facility & is to be completed within 4 years.

- PT - Pakistan urged the mujahideen to adopt a positive plan for cooperation with the UN & the OIC for a political settlement. Pak. Pres. Ghulam Ishaq Khan urged the mujahideen leaders to approach the POW issue from a humanitarian point of view.

12/6 - ASIaweek cited Rabbani as saying that the Moscow talks exceeded everyone's expectations. The Soviets pledged to get Kabul to release nearly 400 mujahid prisoners in exchange for 60-80 Soviet captives & agreed to bring home Soviet Scud missile operators & advisers still in Kabul.



12/6 - PT - Rabbani (above) & Gulbuddin addressed a 4-day seminar about devising a formula for a political solution to the Afghan issue. Rabbani called for a shoor'a to take over the transitional period; Gulbuddin stressed that the tenure of the interim gov't should be limited & that elections should hold first priority.

12/8 - KT - The ROA & the Uzbek SSR signed a protocol to set up a joint transport agency to operate in Mazar-i-Sharif & Tashkent.

12/12 - WSJ -

Afghanistan is offering to sell its huge reserves of natural gas to European markets to get cash to rebuild its war-shattered economy. It has uncapped 31 wells in the vast Sibirgan fields to prepare to resume supplying Soviet republics. Until 1989, gas sales to the Soviets generated almost half of Afghanistan's revenue. Kabul, with gas reserves of 120 billion cubic meters, has discovered a field of about 10 billion cubic meters that may generate over \$300 million a year.



- BIA - "Brotherly Nationalities Magazine" celebrated its 9th anniversary. The magazine, published in 8 languages, "awakens the masses," particularly in the border areas.

- Da Afghanistan Bank grossed over 4½ billion Afs. in 1990. Private sector assets reached Afs. 48,340,000,000 & savings deposits reached Afs. 32,990,000,000.

- Far Eastern Economic Review - Having won significant concessions from Moscow, rebel mujahideen & their Pakistani backers are hanging tough to further weaken Najib's position. UN Special Rep. Benon Sevan thinks this obstinacy could lead to the fragmentation of the country. "Too many guerrilla groups with too much wishful thinking have dominated the scene for too



out differences for the sake of peace. A failure could destabilize the region & suck in all the neighbors," he said.

12/15 - BIA - Drug abuse is increasing in the ROA but, in an effort to combat the evil, mental health centers have been set up in different parts of the country.

12/16 - BIA - A protocol providing co-operation in cultural matters between Tajikistan & the Afghan Artists Union was signed today.

12/17 - KT - ROA Minister of Light Industries & Food-stuffs, Prof. Moh'd Anwar Dost on the subject of wheat & flour supplies:



we have so far purchased only 3,000 tons from Balikh, Kandahar, Baghlan and Herat provinces."

He was also asked on signing of protocols with other friendly countries and he pointed out that if "we can not supply wheat from the Soviet Union, then we will maintain contacts with Hungary, Turkey, Iran, Barazi and Czech and Slovak."

40 thousand tons of wheat and flour were in stocks and the consignments of wheat were also arriving in Kabul. That is why "we thought that we would not face with the scarcity of wheat and flour. But the recent developments which took place in the Soviet Union delayed the process of the delivery of the consignments of goods, and we received only 120,000 tons of wheat out of 203,000 tons from the Soviet Union. As per the plan, our ministry was assigned the task to purchase 62,000 tons of wheat in the current year. But

long, resulting in the death of 2m Afghans. The country is sown with 10m mines & produces 2,000 tons of opium each year, the largest producer of opiates. It is time now for Afghans to sit together & iron

12/19 - The Economist - "Night letters" are circulating in refugee camps in Pakistan threatening death to any Afghan who abandons the jihad & supports the UN peace plan. Gulbuddin, an obvious suspect, denies responsibility. "Terrorism cannot solve our problems," he now says.

12/26 - NYT - Congress wants the State Dept. to create a separate bureau for South Asia (now part of the Middle East & North African Bureau) which would include Afghanistan. The World Bank organized a South Asia Division on 12/1. Congress authorized the division a few months ago and is accusing the State Dept. of dragging its feet.

12/28 - BIA - Over 400 students are enrolled in the Fine Arts Faculty of Kabul University.

- Najibullah pardoned 100 prisoners.

12/29 - BIA - Since its establishment, the Police Academy has trained 17,115 students. "At present, 91 lecturers are training 499 students on crimes, security, logistics, traffic & signals... Fire-fighting & prisoners are also included in the curricula."

- Because of an increased demand for Afghan carpets, not only more women (who used to have a monopoly on carpet weaving) but also a large number of men are taking an active part in this craft.

12/30 - BIA - ROA Prime Minister Khaliqyar told the Council of Ministers of measures taken for sending diplomatic delegations to the Central Asian Commonwealth countries & for consolidating economic, technical, cultural & commercial relations. The Ministry of Mines & Industries is to check out contracts on the export of natural gas to foreign countries. Khaliqyar instructed the Commerce Ministry to get 310,000 tons of wheat to Kabul as soon as possible.

1/2 - NYT - The Soviet-US agreement of 9/13 to stop supplying arms to Afghans went into effect yesterday. Officials on both sides said the pledge had been met before the deadline, clearing the way for the formation of a transitional gov't under the sponsorship of the UN.

12/18 - LA Signal - Najibullah called a meeting of his top generals yesterday just as Russian VP Rutskoi left on a weeklong visit to Iran, Pakistan & Afghanistan.



1/2 - NYT - Pak. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif told reporters that his gov't was not bound by the Washington-Moscow agreement.

A Bush Administration official said that it is not likely that Pakistan can do much on its own to continue a war in Afghanistan so long as it has to devote most of its resources to defense against India. In addition, the United States cut off all military aid to Pakistan in the fall of 1990. The official discounted reports that American weapons were being delivered to the Afghan rebels via Saudi Arabia.


Administration officials also do not believe that India, which has been a strong supporter of President Najibullah, would be willing to back him militarily at a time when New Delhi, having lost its Soviet alliance, is seeking friends in the West.



Sharif

1/5 - Sunday Star-Ledger (Newark) - American released:

Joel DeHart, 34, of Camden was escorted across the Afghan border into Pakistan by the fundamentalist rebel group Hezb-e-Islami, the Party of Islam, and released to U.S. Consul General Gerald Fierstein.



Joel DeHart

"I spent my time speaking Persian and Pushtu and playing with the children," said DeHart, who had been

working on an animal husbandry project for Global Partners. "I was never mistreated or tortured."

DeHart and veterinarian William Lewis, of Decatur, Texas, were abducted July 7. A Hezb-e-Islami spokesman said DeHart's abduction was the act of one rebel commander, not the entire group.

Lewis was detained by a small group known as Nahazat Islami, or Islamic Movement, and was released Oct. 20.

Mike Stroope, managing director of Global Partners, said negotiations by several parties, especially the United Nations, helped to obtain DeHart's release without paying ransom to the kidnapers. Global Partners also thanked the Pakistani and U.S. governments and the Afghan rebel group Hezb-e-Islami for help in the release.

## Iran airlifts food to Bamyan Province

Western reporters in Kabul, quoting UN officials and eyewitnesses, said that Iranian transport planes have dropped food and clothes in Bamyan for people facing hunger and cold weather.

The number of flights is unknown, but the reports said that C-130 Hercules transport planes were used to air-drop wheat, flour and warm clothes on the Bamyan airfield.

The Kabul regime at first denied the report. Later, the regime's aviation minister said he had received a request three months ago from Iranians to undertake such a mission but rejected it, because there were no technical facilities in Bamyan to guide aircraft, and the province is controlled by the Mujahideen. "I learned later," the regime minister said, "that the military airfield had taken charge of guiding the Iranian plane."

The people in central Afghanistan face severe food shortages. To escape famine during winter, several thousand people from Hazarajat have already trekked to Pakistan and Iran. Thirteen years of war and the past year's long winter and spring floods have severely cut farm production in central Afghanistan. UN officials in Kabul said they had sent 500 tons of food to the area, but did not specify by what means.

Bamyan is controlled by the Mujahideen. Hezb Wahdat, a Shia party based in Tehran, has its headquarters in the center of Bamyan. Most people in central Afghanistan belong to the Shia sect of Islam.

The BBC reported from Kabul that Najib agreed to let Iranian planes drop food in Bamyan after the Islamic Republic agreed to sell diesel and gas-

oline to the so-called "national merchants" of the Kabul regime at low prices. The Iranians have not reacted to this allegation. It is also said that the Kabul regime had agreed to the airlift of food under the condition that it would not be made public. Western reporters say the Kabul regime's officials are ashamed of the deal, which permits Iran to spread its influence among the Shia population of Afghanistan. Najib might have agreed to the operation in order to divide the resistance.

Hezb Wahdat, which will be in charge of the distribution of the relief goods, has not made a statement about the operation. It will come under great political pressure from other Mujahideen groups, who suspect the hand of the Kabul regime in the deal.

Defending the food airlift to Bamyan, the Iranian vice president said differences between governments should not stop cooperation between nations.

The operation has provoked an angry reaction from some Mujahideen parties. The Mujahideen are worried about ever-increasing contacts between Kabul and Tehran.

The Kabul regime has also announced they are sending relief goods to Bamyan. It is not clear whether the food will be sent by air or by road. The road to Bamyan passes through areas controlled by other Mujahideen, who might not allow the regime "humanitarian convoy" to pass through their territory.

Prof. Rabbani, before taking a public stand on the issue, has asked the Iranian government to provide further information.

AFGHANews

December 1, 1991

1/10 - WSJ - The Afghan Gov't accepted an invitation from Willy Brandt to attend a conference in Germany to see about ending the Afghan war. Invited but not yet heard from are 3 moderate mujahideen groups & ex-King Zahir Shah.

1/11 - The Economist - The recent changes in what was the USSR may work to Najibullah's advantage. The Central Asian republics are run by men similar to himself: communists-turned-nationalists, who will tolerate state controlled Islam but who hate the idea of a radical controlled gov't in Kabul as much as Najib does. They may not give him arms, but they have given him wheat & fuel. Morale has risen in Kabul. Prices may be high, but the markets are well stocked.



By Richard C. Hottel

## Afghanistan's Future

By Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady

**T**HERE are two schools of thought about the recent Soviet-American decision to cut off arms to the belligerents in Afghanistan: the pessimists and the optimists.

Pessimists believe the Soviet Union and the United States are no longer concerned about the future of Afghanistan. They argue that superpower disengagement is likely to intensify the competition between regional powers to influence events in Afghanistan.

Pakistan believes that to resist India's efforts to achieve hegemony in the subcontinent it is essential that pro-Pakistan groups come to power in Kabul. Consequently, it has been promoting the political fortune of Afghan Islamic fundamentalists, particularly Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Iran, too, desires direct influence in Afghanistan. Largely out of concern over the regional balance of power, Iran has been trying to increase its influence in Afghanistan since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, strengthening the military and political position of the Iran-based Afghan Shiite resistance organizations.

Saudi Arabia is the other contender. After the US, it has been the largest financial supporter of the *mujahideen*. When the legitimacy of Saudi leadership was threatened by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Afghan war enabled the Saudi leadership to strengthen its Islamic credentials both at home and abroad. Although the ideological threat of the Islamic revolution to the Saudi leadership has almost disappeared, the Saudis are still apprehensive of a strong Iranian influence in Afghanistan.

The pessimists believe the superpower involvement in the Afghan conflict had a containing impact on this struggle for influence among regional powers. They argue that without a comprehensive peace, Soviet and US disengagement is likely to lead to a scramble for Afghanistan among the regional powers. As a consequence of the Soviet disen-

agement, they predict that India will also enter this competition. The result will be more war, killing, destruction, and de facto disintegration of Afghanistan.

In contrast, optimists believe that the arms agreement is the strongest indication yet that the superpowers are determined to resolve the conflict politically. Supplying arms to the belligerents has been a contentious issue between the superpowers since 1988. They say the arms cut-off will reduce the intensity of violence and prepare the way for a comprehensive peace mediated by the United Nations.

The US-Soviet joint communiqué seems to support the views of the optimists. The communiqué endorses the UN's five points statement on Afghanistan, issued on May 21, 1991, and it reiterates Soviet and US support for a political resolution, a cease-fire, and fair general elections. The specificity of the communiqué suggests the desire for a comprehensive peace in Afghanistan, instead of considering disengagement as the ultimate objective. The superpowers seem to believe that the best way to achieve a comprehensive peace is to support UN attempts to mediate the final terms of the peace settlement.

**A**LTHOUGH a coordinated US-USSR-UN approach to peace displays a great deal of prudence, there is still a difficult decision about the transitional process. Both the Soviet-American communiqué and the UN statement talk about the need for a transitional period and a transitional mechanism. Neither document, however, clearly states the nature of the such a mechanism. In the past few years, five different transitional arrangements have been discussed:

■ A transitional coalition government between the resistance, the Kabul government, and some independent politicians. This approach was supported by the Soviet Union and the Kabul government but was rejected by the resistance.

■ A resistance-dominated coalition government with minor participation by independent politicians, but excluding the

Kabul government. This was supported by the *mujahideen*, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and, until recently, the US, but was rejected by Kabul and Moscow.

■ A transitional government of nonpartisan Afghan technocrats and independent politicians. This was suggested by the UN and was popular among the supporters of former Afghan King Zahir Shah and high-level bureaucrats in former Afghan governments; it was rejected by the resistance.

■ A Cambodia-like arrangement whereby the UN will administer major Afghan ministries until general elections can be held to determine the composition of the future government. This approach has not received much attention, but is likely to be rejected by the resistance and the Kabul government.

■ A brief transitional period, to prepare the nation for fair general elections. The Soviet-American communiqué seems to suggest this approach.

Since there is no ideal solution for the transitional period that is acceptable to all, it is counterproductive for the UN to emphasize consensus. This simply grants veto power to the various participants and enables obstructionists to indefinitely postpone the political resolution of the conflict.

Any effective peace formula must satisfy some minimum standards of practicality and justice and should be acceptable to a large majority of the people. Such a formula, if supported by the US and the Soviet Union, will prevail and promote the cause of peace in Afghanistan, despite possible opposition from certain groups.

It is important to decide soon on the nature of the transitional arrangements and abandon the search for consensus. A prompt resolution of these obstacles to peace will undoubtedly help establish the hopes of the optimists. Otherwise, chaos may dominate and the scramble for Afghanistan could realize the worst expectations of the pessimists.

■ Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady is professor of Middle East politics at Providence College in Providence, R.I.

• The outlook was not bad. The two big gamesmen, Moscow and Washington, were cutting bait. China, after supporting the *mujahideen* rebels while the Soviet Army was in Afghanistan, saw no reason to continue. However, the logic of non-belligerency stopped there. The smaller players have continued the game. Pakistan is not expected to close the weapons pipeline to the *mujahideen*, especially to the Muslim extremists whom it has always favored. Even if the Karachi government should want to, the Pakistani military establishment might not comply.



And even if the flow of outside money diminishes, there is plenty inside. Afghanistan has become the world's second largest producer of opium.

Saudi Arabia has heavily subsidized one *mujahideen* faction. The Saudis are worried about Iran's religious

radicalism and reviving power in the Gulf region. Iran is increasingly active in the politics of Afghanistan. The Saudis want their interests represented in this arena, and they are not likely to stop sending money. The Organization of the Islamic Conference, dominated by Saudi Arabia, promises to support what it calls the Afghan *jihad* (holy war) for an Islamic government "by any means at its disposal."

The Afghan resistance is splintered. Its factions range from Muslim fanatics to moderate — but also Muslim — traditionalists. They fight each other as well as the government installed by the Soviet Union. Most of the *mujahideen* reject President Najibullah and demand his departure before talks on unity can begin. Moscow signals that he is dispensable. Najibullah says he will leave with dignity — if the ultimate election goes against him. Meanwhile, both sides have enough weapons stockpiled for months, if not years, of fighting.

Benon Sevan of Cyprus, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar's indefatigable representative for Afghanistan, doggedly pursues peace between leaders who hate and mistrust one another. The average Afghan, he says, is fed up with the war and afraid of the cold, hungry winter ahead. The war's toll so far, in a nation of some 15 million, is 1.5 million killed and 2 million injured, countless widows and orphans, 5 million refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and 2 million displaced internally. Yet relief funds from the world community have been drastically cut as new crises have demanded help.

Afghanistan, he says, is the forgotten war. It is, by far, not over.

■ Richard C. Hottel is moderator of 'America and the World' on National Public Radio.

November 21, 1991

# IN AFGHANISTAN,

PEACE MUST WAIT by Rob Schultheis in

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE / DECEMBER 29, 1991

**W**E LEAVE MIRANSHAH, a Pakistani border city, on a bright fall morning, riding in a guerrilla ambulance camouflaged as usual with thick splattered mud, bound for the battlefield headquarters of Comdr. Jalaluddin Haqqani. The road west into Afghanistan winds through stony riverbeds and gullies, across dry desolate hills. A couple of hours out of Miranshah we descend by Khost, a strategic town captured by Haqqani's mujahedeen — the resistance fighters backed by the United States — last spring after a siege that lasted close to a decade. The town is spooky, virtually deserted, its buildings battered and pocked by the fierce fighting and then gutted, looted down to the doorknobs off the doors and the curtains off the windows by the victorious guerrillas.

Beyond Khost, on the road west across the valley floor, the scars of war are even uglier. For more than 20 miles, as far as the eye can see in either direction, not a single building is intact: scores of villages, farms and bazaars blasted, shattered, leveled to rubble and dust by Soviet soldiers and their Afghan Government allies, by air strikes, artillery and rockets. So much of Afghanistan is like this: four million Afghans remain in exile in Pakistan and Iran, almost a third of the country's prewar population, unwilling to bring their families back to a homeland that remains dangerous, and often deadly.

In the afternoon, as we climb a river gorge toward Commander Haqqani's forward command post, on a ridge overlooking Gardez, a besieged Government-held town, we find the war itself. Government jets drone high overhead, and every few minutes we hear the dull grumble of high explosives, bombs, rockets and shells.

When I was last in Afghanistan, 14 months ago, the guerrillas were in bad shape. Nearly two years had passed since the last Soviet combat troops had left, but the resistance seemed incapable of finishing off the Moscow-installed Marxist regime of President Najibullah in Kabul.

Much of the fault lay with the lack of unity among the leaders of the seven major Pakistan-based mujahedeen groups. Some guerrilla leaders were social progressives, full of plans for postwar schools, hospitals, irrigation projects, visions of popular democracy and increased local autonomy, while others wanted to turn the calendar back to the Middle Ages: purdah for women, as little secular education as possible, a strict Islamic theocracy. When you threw in personal political ambitions, the desire for power, for cabinet posts and clout in Kabul after the war, it was a perfect recipe for chaos and discord.

Najibullah took full advantage of his foes' disarray: as the former head of Khad, Afghanistan's K.G.B.-trained secret police, he is a master of political plotting and maneuvering. Aided by some \$300 million a month in Soviet military and nonmilitary supplies — assistance to the mujahedeen from foreign backers like the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China had been drastically cut, in the mistaken belief that the Kabul regime was about to fall anyway — Najibullah used his overwhelming superiority in firepower to hold on to his core turf of the capital, a dozen or so key cities and towns and the country's main roads. He scored similar successes on the diplomatic front, glossing over his bloody record as chief of Khad and claiming to be both a born-again Muslim and a disciple of glasnost, a Gorbachev-style moderate and reformer. To many observers, it seemed as if the mujahedeen had somehow snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.

Now, it seems, things may be changing. Last summer's abortive coup attempt in Moscow removed Najibullah's last allies in the Kremlin. While Soviet arms are still flowing, food and money are not. According to refugees, aid workers and Western journalists, the population in Kabul is hungry and growing restive, and the mercenary militias and Khad members who are the backbone of Najibullah's power are increasingly demoralized and rebellious; some of them reportedly have not been paid in close to six months.

There is also for the first time a sense of unity among the resistance groups though, typical of Afghanistan, it is an attenuated unity, divided into two semi-hostile factions. One faction, consisting of the leaders of the seven parties in Pakistan, has been trying to organize a unified command that can negotiate directly with Moscow.

At the same time, the commanders inside Afghanistan, fed up with the past performance of their party leaders, have begun forming their own government. They have held two shuras, mass meetings of commanders from all across the country, from every party, tribe and ethnic group, which have led to more coordinated military strategies and the beginnings of reconstruction in the 85 percent of the country that lies under mujahedeen control. This unity is constantly threatened, however, by interference from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, which are backing competing guerrilla groups in hopes of gaining leverage in postwar Afghanistan.

A third shura is slated for this winter. Commander Haqqani, whom I am on my way to see, is the acting head of the shura system, the leader of the council of commanders.

**T**HE AMBULANCE DROPS us off on an open saddle overlooking Gardez. Bombs are exploding on the guerrillas' forward positions below, to the west, sending up columns of smoke and dust hundreds of feet high, and mujahedeen rockets and artillery shells are slamming into the town. We trudge up the steep ridgeline toward Haqqani's command post, a cluster of tunnels, foxholes, tents and radio masts at the summit. Take care to stay on the trail, the mujahedeen tell me: yesterday, Government aircraft dumped five plane loads of antipersonnel mines along the ridge, and only the trail itself has been properly cleared.

We reach the top, and after an enemy rocket barrage that sends everyone scrambling for cover, I interview Commander Haqqani in a bomb shelter. He is an imposing figure in his turban, with his gaunt face, flinty eyes and long, graying, henna-streaked beard, like a holy warrior out of the medieval past. With him are two or three Pakistani Army officers, there to help the mujahedeen with logistics and tactics in their assault on Gardez.

According to the Geneva Accords, signed two years ago by the United States, the Soviet Union and Pakistan, neither side in Afghanistan is supposed to receive direct assistance from foreign military personnel, but both sides routinely violate the agreement. Later, at Jalalabad, we will eavesdrop on the shortwave radio and hear Soviet pilots making actual bombing runs on resistance positions.

In keeping with the general mood of the mujahedeen, Commander Haqqani speaks confidently about the future. "Even before the failed coup in Moscow, Najib was in terrible shape because of the bad condition of the Soviet economy; the Soviet Government just couldn't afford to keep supporting him the way they used to. Now, since the coup, the very root of Communism is dead, and Najib's situation is hopeless."

"When we capture Gardez," Haqqani continues, "we will keep going until we reach the very gates of Kabul itself. When Najib is gone, we will establish a proper Islamic state in Afghanistan," he says, adding contemptuously, "not a Khomeini-style regime." Like most Afghans, Haqqani is a follower of the moderate, antiauthoritarian Hanafi sect of Sunni Islam. The angry and emotional politics of Shiite fundamentalism are not his style at all.

Haqqani concludes by praising the commanders' shura system. "Who can bring peace to the country?" he asks rhetorically. "The commanders. They understand the lives of the people, from living in bunkers and trenches, from fighting and suffering for 13 years. They can bring mercy and justice to the people." This is not all empty rhetoric. Before he began his attack on Gardez,

Haqqani dropped leaflets on the town, warning the civilian population to leave; he has stationed trucks and stocked food supplies near the ridge line, to help families flee the fighting.

The battle for Gardez is not going to be easy, or pretty. Later that same afternoon, 65 of Haqqani's mujahedeen are killed when a high-explosive bomb scores a direct hit on their front-line bunker. Yesterday, the guerrillas tell me, four tankloads of Government militiamen refused to surrender, though they were surrounded and out of ammunition. The mujahedeen climbed onto the tanks and dropped grenades down the hatches, killing them all.

This is still a dark, savage war. Najibullah may be weakening, but he still has the firepower to inflict terrible damage. Last year, for example, after a truce was declared around the town of Ghazni, Government planes made a surprise attack, killing more than 200 civilians, according to Western news reports.

On Sept. 4, Afghan Air Force jets hit the center of the peaceful northern town of Talianq, far from any fighting, killing at least 80 civilians and wounding a Swedish United Nations aid worker. "The Government's only policy seems to be to punish the civilian population by bombing them whenever the mujahedeen launch an offensive," says a Westerner who works inside Afghanistan for a United Nations-affiliated aid group. "It's going to be an ugly end to an ugly war."

Another reminder of Afghanistan's complexities confronts my mujahedeen



Commander Haqqani, a mujahedeen leader whose troops are advancing toward the capital.

deen companions and he when we descend to the road and promptly run into a truckload of heavily armed Muslim foreigners bound for the front. For the last few years, hundreds of these "foreign legionnaires," most of them members of the fundamentalist, anti-Western, ultraconservative Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam, have been flocking to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet troops and help their Afghan Marxist allies. In reality, they have proved much more of a hindrance than a help, using arms and money to try to convert Afghans to Wahhabism and sparking sectarian fighting between pro- and anti-Wahhabi resistance groups.

This particular group includes a soft-spoken, London-based Saudi journalist, several other natives of Persian Gulf states and an amiable-looking Algerian hippie with a Rastafarian-style hairdo. They all want to talk, of course, and we end up spending an hour by the roadside, debating Israel, Palestine and American policy in the Middle East, while my Afghan friends look on sourly; arguing with guests is bad form in Afghanistan, and the young Wahhabis are blowing it.

The most excitable of the Arabs says he would like to assassinate George Bush, Hafez Assad, Yitzhak Shamir and Saddam Hussein, as is later had Muslims or enemies of Islam. "We have come here to help our brother Muslims!" he cries. At last they leave for the battlefield, roaring away in a cloud of dust, shouting and waving their assault rifles.

One of my mujahadeen companions watches them go, then turns to me. "They donkey-people," he says, and spits on the ground.

The fight for Gardez has settled into a long-term siege, punctuated by a series of savage attacks and counterattacks. Ultimately, Haqqani is forced to dig in his troops for the winter, hoping to mount a final assault in the spring, when cloud cover makes close air support difficult. It is the same strategy he used to take Khost.

AT THE PAKISTANI END of the Khyber Pass lies Peshawar, the ancient, dusty city that is the unofficial capital of the Afghan resistance. Here, away from the innocent idealism of the mujahadeen on the battlefields, things seem much more tangled.

First of all, there is the problem of actually getting rid of Najibullah. Some Western journalists and diplomats have suggested that the mujahadeen accept a truce. When I mention the idea to Masoud Khalili, a young political officer with the progressive, populist mujahadeen party called Jamiat-i-Islami, he is incredulous. "How can people in the West expect us to make peace, a coalition, with Najib? It would be like

rewarding Hitler at the end of the Second World War by making him president of Germany. When Najib was head of Khad, he was listening to the tortures, the shouts, the screams and cries of thousands of men, women and children. Someone who can hear this and allow it to continue is a bloody, cruel person, a war criminal."

There is strong evidence, gathered by the Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International and volunteer aid groups and journalists, of widespread human rights violations by the Kabul regime and of Najibullah's direct involvement in them. According to these sources, at least tens of thousands of political prisoners have been executed at Pul-i-Charikhi Prison outside the capital during the war years, buried alive by bulldozers, drenched in gasoline and burned, mowed down by machine guns.

In numerous interviews since 1984, many ex-inmates of Pul-i-Charikhi have told me that Najibullah himself sometimes came to the prison late at night and personally executed prisoners. His favorite technique, they say, was to beat his victims to the ground and then stomp them to death with his heavy boots. Under Najibullah, the victims say, Khad employed every imaginable form of torture on its victims, from electrical shock and acid to raping children in front of their parents. A settlement based on power-sharing between Najibullah and the mujahadeen seems highly unlikely.

Now, then, to get rid of Najibullah? "The solution will have to be both military and political," Khalili says. "And it will be difficult. Najib still speaks through the barrel of a gun. At the same time, he uses the Afghan people as a kind of shield. Kabul has 25

million people, and only about 5,000 of them are Communists, traitors. If we fire 5,000 rockets into Kabul we might kill 25,000 people, and maybe 200 of them would be our enemies. It is a terrible dilemma."

The political side of the solution is no easier. "Elections are the best answer," Khalili says. "If America and the other Western countries could pressure the Soviet Union to abandon Najib and help us organize free elections, everything would be all right. But now that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat to America, I'm afraid you have lost interest in Afghanistan. You don't care about us anymore," he says, smiling ruefully.

"You know, what we really need in Afghanistan is a strong leader to replace Najib," Khalili adds, "a good man who is strong enough to lead us into the future." He pauses. "But we don't have that man. He doesn't exist."

But there is no shortage of lesser figures. The nightmare scenario for many Afghans would be the emergence of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, head of the Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar guerrilla group. Before the war, as a student activist at Kabul University, he threw acid in the faces of unveiled female students. His resistance party is violently anti-Western, fights incessantly with other guerrilla groups and has been accused of killing scores, perhaps hundreds, of moderate Afghan exiles and commanders from rival parties, and at least one Western journalist, a British television cameraman. He has links with Libya, and he backed Saddam Hussein and Iraq in the Gulf war.

Despite all this, Hekmatyar has consistently received the lion's share, as much as 70


percent, of the arms and money supplied to the resistance by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China. Many Afghan exiles claim that Hekmatyar is a puppet of Inter-Services Intelligence, the intelligence branch of the Pakistani military responsible for channeling aid to the resistance: thus his favored status. Their greatest fear is that he will succeed in imposing a radical fundamentalist Muslim regime in Kabul, antithetical to the moderate ideals of the average Afghan and politically subservient to Pakistan. Their hope is that he will weaken along with Najibullah, since his power derives almost solely from military aid.

Beyond the twin horrors of Najibullah and Hekmatyar lies the specter of postwar anarchy. Afghanistan may not have the potential to become another Lebanon or Cambodia — it lacks the toxic ethnic and religious hatreds of the former, the doctrinaire political insanity of Poi Pot and company — but chaos and violence remain real dangers, if a stable popular government cannot be formed.

There are already portents of chaos. In much of the territory controlled by the mujahadeen, strong commanders like Haqqani, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Haji Din Mohammad and Sayed Hamed Jaglan have set up stable, relatively peaceful mini-states, with police and Islamic courts, schools and clinics, roads and irrigation projects.

But in other areas outside Government control, a kind of crazy-quilt neofeudalism and warlordism prevails, pitting valley against valley, tribe against tribe, village against village, faction against faction. In one eastern Afghanistan village I visited two years ago, a tiny place with only a few hundred inhabitants, the villagers had split along guerrilla party lines into a half-dozen warring factions, and they whiled away the days sniping at each other with assault rifles and grenade launchers from their bases in the ruins.

Things are also disintegrating in the steadily shrinking territory controlled by the Kabul Government, according to Don Meier, who has been working inside Afghanistan for a United Nations-affiliated aid group for the last 14 months. "Things have really fallen apart since the failed coup in Moscow," he says. "The only thing holding the Govern-



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**AFGHANISTAN FORUM, INC.  
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#### ABBREVIATIONS USED

ACBAR	- Agency Coordinating Bureau for Afghan Relief
AIG	- Afghan Interim Government
BIA	- Bakhtar Information Agency
CC	- Central Committee
CSM	- Christian Science Monitor
DYOA	- Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
FRG	- Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	- German Democratic Republic
ICRC	- Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
KT	- Kabul Times
LAT	- Los Angeles Times
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP	- Northwest Frontier Province
NYT	- New York Times
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Conference
PCV	- Peace Corps Volunteer
PDPA	- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PT	- Pakistan Times
PVO	- Private Voluntary Organization
RC	- Revolutionary Council
ROA	- Republic of Afghanistan
SCMP	- South China Morning Post
UNGA	- United Nations General Assembly
UNOCA	- United Nations Office of the Commissioner for Afghanistan
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WSJ	- Wall Street Journal

Line drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the  
Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

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The Afghanistan Forum, Inc.  
201 East 71st Street, 2K  
New York, NY 10021, USA

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Subscription rates: \$25 per year (US & Canada) (Add \$5 for FORUM PAPERS)  
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ISSN 0889-2148